University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
Winter 1969

Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey
Joseph G. Cook

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Apr 8 15:01:08 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Joseph G. Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey, 36 TENN. L.
REV. 221 (1969).
ALWD 7th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey, 36 Tenn. L.
Rev. 221 (1969).
APA 7th ed.
Cook, J. G. (1969). Criminal law in tennessee in 1968 a critical survey. Tennessee
Law Review, 36(2), 221-275.
Chicago 17th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, "Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey," Tennessee
Law Review 36, no. 2 (Winter 1969): 221-275
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, "Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey" (1969) 36:2
Tenn L Rev 221.
AGLC 4th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, 'Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey' (1969) 36(2)
Tennessee Law Review 221
MLA 9th ed.
Cook, Joseph G. "Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey." Tennessee
Law Review, vol. 36, no. 2, Winter 1969, pp. 221-275. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, 'Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968 - A Critical Survey' (1969) 36
Tenn L Rev 221
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

TENNESSEE
Volume 36

LAW REVIEW
WINTER 1969

CRIMINAL LAW IN TENNESSEE IN 1968 JOSEPH

Number 2
A CRITICAL SURVEY

G. CooK*

I.

Introduction

223

II.

Offenses

223

A.

---------------------------------------------

Against Person -----------------------------------1. Assault with Deadly Weapon ----------------------

223
223

2.

225

Carnal Knowledge ------------------------------

B.

Against Property ----------------------------------1. Receiving Stolen Property -----------------------2. Forgery

227
227
229

C.

Against Person and Property ------------------------I. Robbery
-- ----------------2. Arson
-

229
229
231

D.

Public Offenses ------------------------------------

232

III. Defenses
A.

-----------------------------------

Self-Defense

232

-

232

-------------

IV. Procedure
A.
B.
C.

D.

Equal Protection
1. Payment of Jail Costs

233
233

--

Due Process --------------------------1. Application of Repealed or Amended Laws

-

Self-Incrimination ---------------1. Failure to Comply with Statute
2. Investigation of Public Employees
3. Statements at Evidentiary Hearing
Arrest
1. Probable Cause
2. Notice of Authority and Cause --------------------3. Amendment to Warrant

*Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee, College of Law

235
235

--

--

236
236
237
237
238
238
241
241

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

E.

F.

Search and Seizure .. . ... . .. .. .. . ..
"Frisking" _ .
Items in Plain View .
C on sen t -------------------Reasonableness ---------Particularity of Affidavit _

..

.. . .. .. .
.. . - . 244
- 245
.. . . 247
- 249
250
250
252

Right to Counsel
1.
2.

G.

[Vol. 36

Effective Assistance
On Appeal -

-

---

Confessions----------------------

253
253
254

-

1. Failure to Respond to Accusation
2. Method of Advising of Rights --

H.

I.

Fruits of an Illegal Confession

4.

Application of Miranda to Re-Trials

5.
6.

257
Determination of Admissibility --Use of Co-Defendant's Confession in Joint Trial ------ 257

Grand Jury
1. Racial Discrimination

-

--

-

256

--

257
257

- 258
Guilty Plea
- 258
1. Voluntarily and Understandingly Entered
2. Requirement of Evidence to Determine Punishment __ 260

Triaal
1. Trial by Jury ---- -a. Right to
b. Impartial Jury
------------c. Alternate Juror
--d. Duty of Judge to Approve Verdict
------------2. Conflict of Interest
------3. Jury Instructions --4. Determination of Degree of Murder
K. Punishment
------------1. Cruel and Unusual
2. Indeterminate Sentence Law ---------------------3. Credit for Time in Mental Hospital
4. Parole ---------------------------------------L. Double Jeopardy ----------------------------------1. State and Municipal Prosecutions -----------------2. Determination of Insanity -----------------------3. Harsher Sentence on Re-Trial --------------------M. Juvenile Proceedings ------------------------------J.

-

N.

255

3.

Habeas Corpus

----------------

261
261
261

262
263
264

265
265
266
266

266
268
269
271
272
272
272
273
274
274

19691

CRIMINAL LAW IN TENNESSEE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The present study attempts to provide a comprehensive overview of
the decisions of both federal and state courts reported during 1968'
which have been of significance vis-a-vis state criminal prosecutions in
Tennessee. The designation "critical survey" has been employed, because beyond a r~sum6 of noteworthy decisions an effort will be made to
evaluate cases in terms of their consistency with existing law and policy
objectives. Further, where appropriate, comparative references will be
made when the same or analogous problems have been confronted by
other courts within the recent past.
The criminal process has been the dominant subject of concern of
the United States Supreme Court during the past two decades, and inevi-tably the far-reaching decisions during this period have resulted in a
substantial growth of criminal litigation in lower courts, both state and
federal. As holdings of the Supreme Court are characteristically re-2
stricted in explicit application to the fact situation before the court,
the dimensions of constitutional protections are frequently molded in
decisions of lower courts. The result is that until definitive answers
are given by the Supreme Court, the nature of constitutional rights may
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and thus an awareness of local decisions is imperative. While concern has not herein been limited to
constitutional issues, it will be readily apparent that the greater proportion of decisions of the past year are concerned with substantive due
process.
II.

OFFENSES

A. Against Person
I. Assault with Deadly Weapon.
In Brown v. State3 the defendant was convicted of robbery accomplished by use of a deadly weapon. 4 It appeared that the "weapon"
1. The author has arbitrarily confined this survey to decisions reported in the
National Reporter System during the calendar year 1968, a result of which is
that a number of cases are included which were actually decided in 1967.
Conversely, a number of cases decided near the end of the year were not as
yet reported. In some instances such decisions had been reported and published
in abbreviated form in the Criminal Law Reporter (herein cited CriM. L. RPmR.)
As reports of these cases are fragmentary, and in many instances final judgment
is still pending, they are only briefly discussed in footnotes appended to the
appropriate subject.
2. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), is one of the most extreme instances
of this type of judicial restraint. There the Court, per Justice Goldberg, listed
five factual conditions present in the case and then held that under such
circumstances the defendant had been denied the right to counsel under the
sixth amendment. It was then left to lower courts to decide if the Escobedo
rule applied if any one or more of these factual conditions were absent.
3. 423 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. 1968).
4. TENN. COPE ANN. § 39-3901

(Supp. 1968).
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was a soft drink bottle with which the victim, a taxi cab driver, was
struck across the back of the head. Issue was raised on appeal as to
whether a soft drink bottle could be classified as a deadly weapon. 5 The
court observed that it had never before proffered a definition for the
term "deadly weapon." In two previous decisions the issue had been
raised, however. In Cooper v.State6 it had been held that a toy pistol
did not come within the term. In dicta the court noted that the holding
should not be construed to mean that a real but unloaded pistol was not
a deadly weapon. 7 In Morgan v. States the evidence indicated that the
defendants had used "some kind of an instrument in a sock." These devices were employed to gain access to a house and also to knock one of
the victims unconscious. The court there distinguished between weapons
which were dangerous per se, such as firearms, and weapons which were
dangerous by virtue of the manner in which they were used or attempted
to be used. A hard object wrapped in a sock used as a bludgeon clearly
fit within the latter category.
In affirming the conviction in the Brown case, the court submitted the
following standard:
[T]he test is whether or not the weapon used would be likely to
cause death; if one strikes another with a weapon with sufficient
force and if the one struck might die as a result of the attack made
on him, this is a deadly weapon. 9
The court cited an Illinois decision' 0 in which a bottle was recognized
as a deadly weapon. Also referred to was a Missouri case" in which a
two foot length of broomstick was found to be a deadly weapon. It was
there observed by the Missouri Supreme Court that the deadliness of a
weapon may be a function of the relative sizes and strengths of the
2
victim and the assailant.'
5. Robbery is punishable by imprisonment for five to fifteen years; robbery accomplished by the use of a deadly weapon is a capital offense, punishable by a
minimum imprisonment of ten years. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1968).
The defendant in the present case had received a sentence of ten years.
6. 201 Tenn. 149, 297 S.W.2d 75 (1956).
7. Even here, however, the court did not express an opinion on the issue: "That
question will be decided if, and when, it should arise." Id. at 154, 297 S.W.2d
at 78. It is clear that such conduct does constitute a criminal assault. See
State v. Smith, 21 Tenn. 457 (1841). The open question is whether it amounts
to assault with a deadly weapon. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1206 (1931).
8. 415 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1967).
9. 423 S.W.2d at 495.
10. Sleeting v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 161 Ill. App. 449 (1911).
11. State v. Henderson, 356 Mo. 1072, 204 S.W.2d 774 (1947).
12. "[T]he classification of such weapons as 'deadly' may depend in part on the
effect produced by them, and the strength of the assailant who wields them.
And we think it can be further affirmed that the strength and vitality of the
victim of the assault also may be considered. For instance an assault on a
child or a weak and defenseless person with a given weapon might be likely
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The Brown case is of marginal significance in the development of a
clearly defined notion of the term "deadly weapon." Yet it does as
much as any court is willing to do, since it is desirable that the concept
be left in a state of appropriate vagueness to accommodate the variety
of items which may present themselves. 13 The decision adds one item
to the list of devices which clearly fall within the definition, at least
when the victim is actually struck with the bottle. The quoted passage
is at best ambiguous as to the result where the victim is threatened with
a soft drink bottle, but the threat is not carried out, perhaps because
the victim acquiesces to the assailant's demands. Indeed, a literal reading suggests that a soft drink bottle is not a deadly weapon until the
assailant strikes the victim with such force -that death might result. This
clearly would be an undesirable restriction on the concept. The opinion
is preferably read to mean that since a soft drink bottle can be wielded in
such a manner that it could reasonably be expected to cause death,
therefore when a soft drink bottle is employed as a weapon, it is a deadly
weapon. It may be argued that this interpretation is overlybroad, leaving open the possibility that virtually anything-a book or pencil, for
example-could conceivably be used in such a manner as to cause death.
Here it :is
suggested that a test of reasonableness could be employed in
terms of the relative likelihood that the object in question could cause
death.
2. Carnal Knowledge
Tennessee has -the most stringent carnal knowledge statute in the
United States, setting the age at which a woman is capable of giving
consent to sexual intercourse at twenty-one. 14 The presumption of inability to consent is conclusive. 1 5 To mitigate the severity of this offense, the statute provides a series of defenses available to the accused,
among them the following:
[E]vidence of the female's reputation for want of chastity, at and
to produce death or great bodily harm, whereas the contrary would be true- as
against a vigorous adversary." Id. at 1078, 204 S.W.2d at 779. See also Cummonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A.2d 125 (1950), holding that the fist of
a contender for the heavyweight boxing championship may be a deadly weapon.
13. See generally 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 361 (Anderson ed.
1957) (hereinafter cited as WHARTON).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (1955).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
15. That is to say, whether the victim was of such maturity as to be fully capable
of giving knowing and understanding consent to the act of sexual intercourse
is not a factual issue before the trial court. It is true that the defenses stipulated in the statute by-and-large reflect a belief that certain factual circumstances are persuasive evidence that the victim was capable of consent and is
not in need of protection. These are, however, collateral approaches to the
issue, and even here the actual ability of the victim to consent is not before
the court.
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before the time of the commission of the
alleged offense, shall be
16
admissible in behalf of the defendant.
This defense was liberally construed in favor of the defendant in 1947
in Ledbetter v. State.17 There the prosecutrix testified that she met
the defendant in a "beer joint" only a few days prior to the alleged
offense. She was at that time in the company of a woman described by
the court as "of unsavory reputation" who was the mother of two illegitimate children. The prosecutrix was fifteen years old at the time of
the alleged offense; the defendant was twenty-two. After their first
encounter, the prosecutrix wrote the defendant an amorous letter urging
him to meet her at a designated place. The defendant complied with
her request and ultimately spent the night with her in the same room
where her aunt and uncle were sleeping. It was during this time that
the defendant was alleged to have had sexual intercourse with the
prosecutrix. The court held that establishing a reputation for want of
chastity did not require proof of any specific act of intercourse,' 8 and
that the facts proven established the prosecutrix' reputation for want
of chastity and constituted a complete defense. 19
This issue was again raised in the recent decision of Mangrum v.
State.20 In this case the prosecutrix was nineteen years of age; the defendant was twenty-four. The trial court refused to give a charge to
the jury requested by the defendant which attempted to state the reputation for want of chastity defense as explained in the Ledbetter case. 21
Rather, it charged the jury, in material part, as follows:
16.

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (1955) (only applicable if the victim is
age of fourteen). It may be noted that the statute merely provides
evidence "shall be admissible in behalf of the defendant," not that
tutes a defense per se. However, in Ledbetter v. State, 184 Tenn.

TENN.

over the

that the
it consti396, 199

S.W.2d 112 (1947), it was held that proof of such a reputation would constitute
a complete defense to the charge.
184 Tenn. 396, 199 S.W.2d 112 (1947).
The statute establishes as a separate defense that the female was "at the time
and before the carnal knowledge, a bawd, lewd, or kept female." TENN. CODr ANN.
§ 39-3706 (1955). See Jamison v. State, 117 Tenn. 58, 94 S.W. 675 (1906).
"[T]he female, Lela Smith, by her general conduct in loitering around 'beer
joints,' associating constantly with well known prostitutes in public drinking
places, coupled with a willingness to use her uncle's home as a place of assignation, thereby established a reputation for sexual impurity." 184 Tenn. at 403,
119 S.W.2d at 115.
432 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
"I have been asked to charge you and do charge you that if a woman has a
reputation of being unchaste she is considered a lewd character within the
meaning of Section 39-3706 even though there is no proof of any specific act
of illicit relationship." 432 S.W.2d at 499. This is a somewhat inarticulate statement of the defense in that it confuses the "reputation for want of chastity"
defense and the "bawd, lewd or kept female" defense. The trial court thus might
be justified in refusing this charge if the "want of chastity" defense was adequately
covered in the charge as given.
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The question is, whether she is actually chaste and virtuous
at the time of the alleged carnal knowledge. In other words,
the reputation for want of chastity is not a conclusive defense, for
the offense is predicated upon character rather than the reputation of a female for chastity and virtue. If her character, that is,
what she really is at the time of the alleged carnal knowledge or
act charged, is pure
and virtuous, and she is at the time chaste,
22
is the question.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that this charge was inadequate,
quoting from Ledbetter to the effect that the reputation of the woman
for want of chastity can be established without proof of any specific
acts of intercourse.
The Mangrurn decision, as the Ledbetter decision, reflects a judicial
awareness of who the parties are and the relative contribution of the
man and the woman to the nefarious enterprise. The carnal knowledge
of a female between the ages of twelve and twenty-one statute, enacted
in 1893, is hopelessly anachronistic in the late 20th Century, at least in
those instances in which it is applied to individuals of relatively mature
years. 23 There is little the courts can do about that. 24 They can, however, within the context of the existing law, liberally construe the defenses available for this offense and thereby alleviate to some degree the
existing disparity between the statute and contemporary societal values.
B. Against Property
1. Receiving Stolen Property
In Deerfield v. State25 it was held that in order to be guilty of receiving stolen property, 26 it must be shown that the defendant received
the property from a third party, that is, the defendant could not be
guilty of the offense if he stole the property himself.2 7 In absence of
such evidence, the conviction in this case could not stand. 28 However,
the court observed that concealing stolen property was a separate offense,
22. 432 S.W.2d at 500.
23. For one suggested solution, see Myres, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A
Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MICH. L. REV. 105 (1965).
24. But see People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964).
25. 420 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. 1967).

26.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-4217 (1955).

27. To same effect, Franklin v. State, 202 Tenn. 666, 308 S.W.2d 417 (1957) (cited
in the principal case). See also 2 WHARTON § 576. Cf. Peek v. State, 213 Tenn.
323, 375 S.W.2d 863 (1964).
28. Curiously, the defendant had not assigned as error that the crime of receiving
stolen property had not been proven. Rather, according to the court, "The
State has called to the attention of this Court the fact that this record contains
no evidence establishing the fact that the defendant was guilty of receiving and
concealing stolen property." 420 S.W.2d at 651. The court agreed with the
state's argument on behalf of the defendant.
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with which the thief himself could be charged,2 9 and remanded the case
for trial on this charge. While the statute recognized separate offenses
of "receiving" and "concealing" stolen property,3 0 the difficulty in the
Deerfield case arose from improperly charging the defendant in the
indictment.
In a later decision, Moore v. State,31 the defendants were charged with
"receiving and concealing stolen property." It was argued on the
authority of the Deerfield case that the convictions were void since
"receiving" and "concealing" stolen property were separate offenses
and could not be charged as a single crime. The court held that while
it would be preferable to allege a single crime in the indictment, it was
not prejudicial error to charge the offenses conjunctively as was done
32
in this case.
In an effort to avoid this confusion in the future, the statute has
been amended to clearly cover two separate and distinct offenses. 33 In
addition, the line of demarcation in determining the severity of the
potential punishment was raised from "goods over the value of $60.00"

29. Jones v. State, 219 Tenn. 228, 409 S.W.2d 169 (1966). See also 2 WHARTON § 576.
30. "Every person who shall fraudulently receive or buy, conceal, or aid in con-

cealing ..."

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-4217 (1955).

31. 432 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
32. The issue does not seem as crucial in this case as it would appear that the
defendants could have been found guilty of either offense.
33. Public Acts, 85th General Assembly, 2nd Session, Chapter 609:
Section 1, BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
OF TENNESSEE. That Sections 39-4217 and 39-4218 of Tennessee Code Annotated be, and the same are hereby repealed, and the following inserted in lieu
thereof:
"39-4217. (A) Every person who shall fraudulently receive or buy any goods
over the value of one hundred ($100.00) dollars, feloniously taken or stolen
from another, or goods obtained by robbery or burglary, knowing the same to
have been so obtained, with the intent to deprive the true owner thereof,
shall be guilty of receiving stolen property over the value of one hundred
($100.00) dollars.
(B) Every person who shall fraudulently conceal or aid
in concealing any goods over the value of one hundred ($100.00) dollars
feloniously taken or stolen from another, or goods obtained by robbery
or burglary, knowing the same to have been so obtained with the intent to
deprive the true owner thereof, shall be guilty of concealing stolen property
over the value of one hundred ($100.00) dollars.
(C) Any person found
guilty of either receiving stolen property over the value of one hundred
($100.00) dollars, or concealing stolen property over the value of one hundred
($100.00) dollars, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than three
(3) years nor more than ten (10) years."
"39-4218. If any person receives stolen property or conceals stolen property
as such crimes are defined in 39-4217, and the value of the property received
or concealed does not exceed the value of one hundred ($100.00) dollars, the
offender shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one (1) year
nor more than five (5) years. Provided further, that no person shall be
convicted of more than the one offense of larceny or either of the offenses
defined in 39-4217 and 39-4218 growing out of the same felonious transaction."
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to "goods over the value of $100.0O."34

229

It is further provided that a de-

fendant cannot be convicted of both larceny and receiving or concealing
stolen property arising out of the same transaction. 85
2. Forgery
Wilson v. State86 raised the novel question of whether a defendant
could be guilty of forgery in executing his own name, an issue apparently
not previously raised in a Tennessee case. The defendant introduced
himself to a merchant as one Clyde Wilson and represented that he
had married the daughter of a person known to the merchant. In
light of this the defendant's check was accepted by the merchant. It
was later discovered that the defendant was indeed named Clyde Wilson,
but he was not the Clyde Wilson he led the victim to believe he was.
The defendant was convicted of forgery and contended on-appeal that
he could not be guilty of the offense since he signed his own name.
Forgery is defined by statute as "the fraudulent making or alteration
of any writing to the prejudice of another's rights." 3

7

The court held

that the defendant's conduct in this case would constitute forgery. In
one early Tennessee decision38 the argument that one could not be
guilty of forgery when he signed his own name to a document was rejected, but there it was the document, not the signature, which was
determined to be a forgery. However, a number of decisions from other
jurisdictions had considered the issue raised in the present case and had
uniformly declared the conduct to amount to forgery. 39 Such would
seem the only result consistent with the legislative purpose of the
40
statute.
C. Against Person and Property
1. Robbery
The crimes of robbery4' and bank robbery 42 are separate and distinct offenses. In State v. Smith 43 the defendant was charged with rob34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 421 S.W.2d 91 (Tenn. 1967).
37.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-1701 (1955).

38. Luttrell v. State, 85 Tenn. 232, 1 S.W. 886 (1886).
39. People v. Rushing, 130 Cal. 449, 62 P. 742 (1900); Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127
(1859); Thomas v. First National Bank, I01 Miss. 500, 58 So. 478 (1912); Peoples
Bank & Trust Co. v. Fidelity &Casualty Co., 231 N.C. 510, 57 S.E.2d 809 (1950);
Edwards v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 50, 108 S.W. 673 (1908). See 2 WHARTON § 629.
40. Alternatively, the defendant might be charged with obtaining property by false
pretenses. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1901 (1955).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1968).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3902 (1955).
43. 432 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
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bery, but he sought to quash the indictment contending -that the allegation showed that this was a bank robbery, and thus the defendant should
be charged under the statute specifically applicable to bank robbery.
The only indication in the presentment that the offense was bank robbery was the statement that the victims were employees of the bank
and that the money was the property of the bank. The court held
that this did not establish that the robbery occurred in a bank, and therefore the indictment should not be quashed.
Of greater interest is the potential issue presented had the allegation
stated that the robbery had indeed occurred in a bank. Would it still
be permissible to charge the defendant with robbery? Until 1955 no
problem was presented. Bank robbery was punishable more severely
than robbery; robbery was clearly a lesser included offense. 44 However,
no longer is this the case, because the robbery statute was amended to
allow capital punishment where the robbery is accomplished by the use
of a deadly weapon. 4 5 No amendment regarding the use of a deadly
weapon was made to the bank robbery statute. Therefore, today robbery
is a lesser included offense where no deadly weapon is used; it is a
greater offense, in terms of the potential punishment, where such a
weapon is used. The implication of the court in the Smith decision is
that if a bank robbery is alleged, the defendant must be tried under
the bank robbery statute.
Viewing the problem as one of statutory construction this would
seem eminently correct. I' is a general rule of construction that, where
one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with
part of the subject in more specific terms, in case of conflict the more
specific statute should prevail.4 6 This rule has frequently been applied
in criminal cases. In some instances the application of the more specific
statute has afforded a harsher punishment; 4 7 in others the result has
been a punishment less severe. 4 8 It has been said that the application
49
of the more specific statute is particularly compelling in the latter case.
In short, analytically speaking, there is overwhelming authority to support the conchsion that an armed bank robbery should be tried under
the bank robbery statute.
44. See Bibbs v. State, 162 Tenn. 646, 39 S.W.2d 1024 (1931).
45. TENN. PUB. AcTs OF 1955, ch. 72.
46. 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5204 (3d ed. Horack 1943)

inafter cited

(here-

SUTHERLAND).

47. Enzor v. U.S., 262 F. 2d 172 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 359 U.S. 953, 3 L.Ed.2d
761, 79 S.Ct. 740 (1959); Georges v. U.S., 262 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1959); State
v. Mangiaracina, 344 Mo. 99, 125 S.W.2d 58 (1939).
48. Commonwealth v. Litman. 187 Pa. Super. 537, 144 A.2d 592 (1958); Thomas
v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. App. 628, 91 S.W.2d 716 (1936).
49. Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1959) (and cases cited therein).
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However, there is persuasive evidence to -the point that the customary
rules of statutory construction should not be applied in this case. The
notion that the statute more particularly applicable to the case should
apply is nothing more than a reasonable implication of legislative intent.
Any rule of statutory construction can be ignored where it is clear that
its application would distort the legislative policy considerations. There
is no question but that prior to 1955 it was legislative policy to view bank
robbery as a more serious offense than robbery. The 1955 amendment
did not alter the punishment for either offense but in effect created a
new offense where robbery had been accomplished by means of a deadly
weapon. Unfortunately the amendment was only added to the robbery
statute. There is no reason to believe that because the penalty for
robbery under aggravated circumstances is now more severe than for
bank robbery that the legislative intent of the amendment was to make
armed robbery a more severe offense than armed bank robbery.
One solution is to allow the prosecutor to do what it appears was
done in the Smith case-allege facts which establish the offense of armed
robbery, but omit the fact that the robbery occurred in a bank. While
such a sub rosa method might be endurable in the present instance, it
can not be recommended as an acceptable procedure generally as it
would clearly work injustices where the legislative intent was to give the
defendant the benefit of a less harsh particular statute. 50 For example,
in a Texas case, Thomas v. State5 ' the defendant was found guilty of
keeping premises at which bets on horses were taken. A general statute
prohibiting gambling activities carried a penalty of from two to four
years in the penitentiary. Another statute dealing specifically with the
defendant's activities carried a maximum jail term of ninety days. The
court held that the defendant should be tried under the latter statute.
Certainly the legislative policy reflected in such a statutory scheme would
be defeated if the prosecution could bring the defendant under the
felony statute by vaguely wording the statement of the offense in the
charge. The more desirable solution would appear to be for the legislature to amend the bank robbery statute in the same manner as the robbery statute, providing for increased punishment where a bank robbery
is accomplished by use of a deadly weapon.
2. Arson
In Murphy v. State52 the issue was raised as to whether a house
50. Furthermore a defendant might defeat such a tactic through the use of a plea
in abatement. See, e.g., Bonds v. State, 421 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1967).
51. 129 Tex. Crim. App. 628, 91 S.W.2d 716 (1936).
52. 426 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1968).
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trailer was a "structure" within the contemplation of the crime of
arson.53 The court held that it was a "structure" since it had become
a fixture attached to -the real estate. In what would appear to be the
only other case raising this issue, the Supreme Court of Indiana held
that a house trailer was not a "dwelling house" within the meaning of
54
their arson statute where it had not been attached to the real estate.
In the present case the court observed that both a phone line and a pipe
to a butane tank several feet away were attached to the trailer and thereby qualified as a "structure".
Several new offenses were created by statute relating to the use and
possession of fire bombs. 55 The available sanctions are more severe
56
than in the general arson statute.
D. Public Offenses
The year witnessed the passage of a host of new criminal statutes
aimed primarily at potential civil disorders. Among the newly created
offenses are disrupting communication with the police and fire department, 57 trespassing in a public school building, 58 encouraging students
to leave school, 59 destruction of vegetation on highway right of ways, 60
the manufacture, possession and use of fire bombs, 6 1 damaging property
64
3
during a state of emergency, 62 rioting, and looting.
III. DEFENSES
A. Self-Defense
Where a defendant is charged with homicide and he claims selfdefense, whether or not a duty to retreat is recognized, 65 it must be demonstrated that the defendant employed deadly force from apparent
necessity. 66 Thus where the defender has adequately subdued his assailant, any further counter-assault may be viewed as going beyond

53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-501

(Supp. 1968).

54. Simmons v. State, 234 Ind. 489, 129 N.E.2d 121 (1955) (Such was the decision
of the court. However, the remaining four members of the five man court
subscribed to a concurring opinion which found the trailer to be a dwelling.)
55. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5106 to 39-5113 (Supp. 1968).
56. The minimum sentence for arson was also raised from one year to three years.
Id. § 39-501 (Supp. 1968).
57. Id. § 39-5115 (Supp. 1968).
58. Id. § 39-1214.
59. Id. § 39-1011.
60. Id. § 39-2308.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. §§ 39-5106 - 39-5113.
Id. § 39-5114.
Id. §§ 39-5101 - 39-5104.
Id. § 39-5105.
See Crowder v. State, 76 Tenn. 669 (1882).
See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 38-101 and 38-102 (1955).
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the bounds of acceptable self-defense. An obvious case was presented
in the 1962 decision of Nance v. State.6 7 There the defendant was standing at a bar in a tavern when the deceased approached him and after
an exchange of words, according to the defendant, the deceased pulled
out a knife. At this point the defendant drew a pistol and shot the
deceased twice. The deceased staggered some distance across the room,
then fell to the floor. The defendant walked over to him and shot him
a third time in the head. The third shot caused the death. Whatever
might have been the culpability of the defendant following the first two
shots, the court had no difficulty in finding that the third shot obliterated any claim of self-defense. 68
A similar problem arose in May v. State.6 9 The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of a fellow inmate in the
state penitentiary. The defendant and the deceased engaged in a fight
in their cell during which the defendant stabbed the deceased numerous
times, resulting in his death. The defendant contended that he had
been the victim of an initial attack by the deceased, who was armed
with a knife. There was also evidence that the defendant had no opportunity to obtain a knife, and that he had been subjected to four
"shakedowns" during the day, none of which revealed a weapon. The
state contended that, notwithstanding the possibility of the defense of
self-defense, such a justification was obviated by the defendant's actions
in that the victim had be'rr stabbed many times and the prison guards
found the defendant "belligerent and vengeful" when they pulled him
away from the deceased, anxious to continue the attack. Citing the
Nance decision, the court felt that it was well within the province of the
jury to reject the theory of self-defense. 70
IV.

PROCEDURE

A. Equal Protection
I. Payment of jail costs
When a defendant is assessed a fine an~d costs following the conviction of an offense, he may be imprisoned until the fine and costs
67. 210 Tenn. 328, 358 S.W.2d 327 (1962).

68. "When the record shows though, as it does here, that the plaintiff in error
followed and administered a third shot after the deceased had retreated and
was falling to the floor, this obviously takes away the degree of self-defense
that is necessary to excuse the homicide, because when the deceased had put
himself in this position there was no reason for any apprehension of great
bodily harm on the part of the plaintiff in error." Id. at 332-33, 358 S.W.2d
at 329.
69. 420 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1967).
70. See generally I WHARTON § 214.
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are paid,71 unless he has confessed judgment with good sureties. 72 The
defendant is allowed to work out the sum at the rate of two dollars per
73
day.
In State ex rel. Hawkins v. Luttrell7 4 the defendant was assessed
$173.00 as costs for the ninety-nine day period he was confined to jail
awaiting trial. The defendant had been unable to post bond pending
trial because of his indigency. He contended that a jail term in lieu
of payment of these costs constituted a denial of equal protection of the
laws under the fourteenth amendment. It was not the defendant's
argument that working out a fine per se was a denial of equal protection
but rather that such was the case as regarded this particular fine since
it would not have been sustained had the defendant been financially
able to post bond.
The constitutional basis for this argument is found in Griffin v.
Illinois,75 in which the United States Supreme Court held that an in-

digent defendant is entitled to either a transcript of the trial or some
alternative method whereby he may obtain adequate review. While
there was no obligation on the state to provide any appellate review at
all, if appeals were allowed, the state was under a duty to see to i't tha-t
there was no invidious discrimination resulting from financial inability. 76
The defendant in the present case sought to extend -this rationale to
77
pre-trial incarceration, an argument which the court found persuasive.
Distinguished from this case was the issue raised in State ex rel. Dillehay
v. White,78 wherein the defendant was confined to work out the costs of
his prosecution on a misdemeanor charge. There it was held that the
defendant had not been denied equal protection of the laws, since the
fines were levied on rich and poor alike. 79 It has been held in some
§ 40-3203 (1955).
Id. § 40-3202 (1955).
Id. § 41-1223 (Supp. 1968).
424 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn. 1968)
351 U.S.- 12 (1956).
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts."
Id. at 19. See also Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
77. "We agree the statutes requiring an indigent defendant to remain in jail beyond
his term to work out costs incurred as jail fees while awaiting trial do operate
to discriminate against the defendant due to his poverty, and are in conflict
with the above copied language of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It is obvious that these particular costs would not
be inturred by a defendant able to make bond and, in fact, would not be
costs incurred by rich and poor alike." 424 S.W.2d at 191.
78. 217 Tenn. 524, 398 S.W.2d 737 (1966).
79. "It would, in fact, be a denial to the courts of their power to enforce judgmentsan imposition on the integrity of the courts-if one financially unable to pay
is relieved of his obligation. The rich man would be the one deprived of equal
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

TENN. CODE ANN.
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jurisdictions that requiring a defendant to work out a fine imposed
as punishment following conviction is unconstitutional as a denial of
equal protection where the result is a jail term in excess of that allowed
by statute for the particular offense, at least where the defendant is
shown to be an indigent.8 0 A recent Virginia decision has taken a different approach and held that confinement for costs (as opposed to
fines for punishment) constitutes involuntary servitude in violation of
the thirteenth amendment.8 1 This disparity in decisions would appear
to create a fertile ground for a constitutional consideration by the United
82
States Supreme Court.
B. Due Process
1. Application of repealed or amended laws
It is a rule of common law that a defendant cannot be convicted
under a repealed statute, and this is true notwithstanding the fact that
the statute was in force at the time of the act alleged.83 A number of
jurisdictions have abrogated this rule by enacting general savings statutes which permit the prosecution of an offense under a repealed
statute.8 4 A newly enacted statute in Tennessee provides for such prosecutions in this state.8 5
A related problem which has arisen in other jurisdictions concerns
the effect of a savings statute on a statutory reduction in the punishment
for a particular offense. The common law rule affords the defendant

80.

81.
82.
83.

protection if he had to pay and the indigent were set free. Our system of
justice must always balance the interest of society as against the interests of the
individual-specifically, in this case, the interests (sic) of the State is enforcing
its judgments as against the interests of the indigent defendant." Id. at 532,
398 S.W.2d at 740. This holding has been followed by the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals in Wilson v. Sloan, 4 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2299 (Dec. 5, 1968),
Galbreath, J.,dissenting, citing Wright v. Matthews, 163 S.E.2d 158 (Va.
Sup. Ct. App. 1968), (see infra text accompanying note 81). Cf. Dillehay v.
White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), which in effect reversed the
Supreme Court of Tennessee decision in the Dillehay case because a portion of
the fees had accrued while the defendant was awaiting trial.
People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966);
Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. App. 1968). But cf. State
v. Hampton, 209 So.2d 899 (Miss. 1968). In the Dillehay case the defendant had
received a ninety day sentence, the maximum permitted by statute, plus confinement for an additional ninety-eight days to work out the costs.
Wright v. Matthews, 163 S.E.2d 158 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1968).
See Dunn v. U.S., 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967). Noted in 33 Mo. L. REV.
317 (1967). See also Yates v. U.S., 356 U.S. 363 (1958).
1 SUTHERLAND § 2046; 1 WHARTON § 173. See also Wharton v. State, 45 Tenn.
1 (1867), a questionable decision.

Cf. I SUTHERLAND § 2046, text accompanying

footnote 4.
84. 1 SUTHERLAND § 2048. No ex post facto problem is presented here, since the
defendant is merely being prosecuted in accordance with the law in force at
the time of his offense. Cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-114 (Supp. 1968).
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the benefit of the reduced punishment; the savings statute raises the
possibility of punishing the defendant according to the law in effect at
the time of the offense. 86 The Tennessee statute has avoided this issue
by specifically providing that "[i]n the event the subsequent act provides
for a lesser penalty, any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with
the subsequent act." 87
C. Self-Incrimination
1. Failure to Comply with Statute
Among the more troublesome United States Supreme Court decisions of the past year were the cases of Marchetti v. United States,88
Grosso v. United States,89 and Haynes v. United States,9 0 all dealing
with the problem of self-incrimination, In Marchetti the defendant
was convicted of a conspiracy to evade payment of a federal occupational
tax on gamblers. In Grosso the defendant was convicted of failing to
pay an excise tax imposed on gambling. In Haynes the defendant was
convicted of the possession of a sawed-off shotgun which had not been
registered. In each of the three cases the Court held that compliance
with the statute which the defendant was alleged to have violated would
have incriminated him in regard to other federal and state laws. The
Court did not hold the statutes in question unconstitutional but held
only that where there exists "substantial hazards of self-incrimination,"9 1
the defendant may properly assert the privilege against self-incrimination
and may not be punished for a failure to comply with the statutes.
A factor of apparent significance in the decisions is that they all
involve statutes directed to a "selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities." 92 On this basis, a federal court in Tennessee in
United States v. McGee 93 distinguished a failure to comply with statutes
regarding the manufacture of intoxicants because the statutes were aimed
"at the entire liquor distillery industry." 94
86. For decisions reaching oppoite results on this issue, see People v. Oliver, 1
N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956), and People v. Harmon,
34 Cal.2d 9, 351 P.2d 329, 4 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1960).
87. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-114 (Supp. 1968)
88. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
89. 390 U.s. 62 (1968).
90. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).

91. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. at 61.
92. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965)
in Marchetti).
93. 282 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
94. Id. at 551. But cf. U.S. v. Fine, 293 F. Supp. 189

(quoted

(E.D. Tenn. 1968), pub-

lished too late for inclusion in this survey. Regarding tax forfeiture, see U.S. v.
One 1965 Buick, 397 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1968). Cf. U.S. v. Coin and Currency in
the Amount of $8,674.00, 393 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1968).

1969]

CRIMINAL LAW IN

TENNESSEE

2. Investigation of Public Employees
The privilege of self-incrimination was also an issue in Gardner v.
Broderick.9 5 In 1967, in Garrity v. New Jersey,98 police officers were
convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct justice. At a previous investigative
hearing, the officers were advised that they could invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination, but that if they did so they would be subject
to removal from office. The defendants thereafter did answer questions,
and some of these answers were used against -them in the criminal charge.
The Court held that the defendants had been denied the privilege
against self-incrimination. 9 7 Garrity was a 5-4 decision, and Justice
Fortas, one of the majority, indicated that had the appellants merely refused to give information directly related to their official responsibilities
at the investigation and as a result had been discharged, he would affirm
the action of the state, because there would then be adequate grounds to
discharge the employees for cause.98
In 'the Gardner case it appeared that the Court was confronted with
the situation hypothesized by Justice Fortas. 99 The issue before the
Court was "whether a policeman who refuses to waive the protection
which the privilege gives him may be dismissed from office because of
that refusal."' 100 Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, held that he
could not be dismissed. Reiterating his position in the Garrity case;' 0 1
Justice Fortas found the present case distinguishable. Here the appellant
did not refuse to answer questions; he refused to waive his privilege
against self-incrimination, and, the Court held, one could not be discharged for his refusal to waive a constitutional right. 102
3. Statements at Evidentiary Hearing
In Simmons v. United States, 0o at a pre-trial hearing the defendant
95. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
96. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
97. "We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced confessions prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of confessions obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it
extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body
politic." Id. at 500.
98. Fortas, J., concurring in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1967).
99. Such was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals of New York. See Gardner
v. Broderick, 20 N.Y.2d 227, 229 N.E.2d 184, 282 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1967).
100. 392 U.S. at 276.
101. "If the appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without
being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his answers
or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself . . . the privilege
against self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal." Id. at
278.
102. To same effect; Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
103. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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attempted to suppress evidence which had been seized by the police. In
order to establish his standing to object to the use of the evidence, the
defendant testified that he was the owner of the object in question, a
suitcase. The motion to suppress was denied, and the defendant's testimony at the hearing was admitted against him at the trial. The Supreme
Court held this procedure to be improper in that the defendant was
forced to choose between challenging what he believed to be a violation
of his fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and thereby waiving his fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination, or foregoing his objection against the evidence in order
to preserve his privilege against self-incrimination. "In these circumstances we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to
10 4
be surrendered in order to assert another."'
D. Arrest
1. Probable Cause
Among the more significant decisions handed down by the United
States Supreme Court during the past year was Terry v. Ohiolo5 which
involved the power of the police to stop and interrogate a person found
in suspicious circumstances, but circumstances short of probable cause
for arrest. Defendant Terry and his companions were observed by a
policeman on a street behaving in such a manner that the officer suspected they were planning the robbery of a store in front of which they
passed numerous times. The officer stopped the three and after some
inconclusive responses to questions carried out a "frisk" which revealed
a pistol. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The
conviction was affirmed in an 8 - 1 decision. While the Court acknowledged that there was no probable cause for arrest, the issue in this case
was whether there was probable cause for detention, the fourth amendment being a prohibition of unreasonable seizures of the person. Answering this question in the affirmative !the Court had little difficulty
in finding that under the circumstances the "frisk" was a reasonable
action for the officer's own protection, and that the result of the "frisk"
gave rise to probable cause for arrest.1 06
A determination of the existence of probable cause for arrest became
necessary in West v. State.1 °0 An officer had been dispatched shortly
after three in the morning to investigate a break-in at a tire service com104. 390 U.s. at 394.
105. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
106. The search and seizure aspect of this and related cases is discussed infra,
text accompanying notes 132 to 136.
107. 425, S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. 1968).
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pany. After observing the scene of the crime, he left the tire company
and encountered -the defendant approximately a block away. He
stopped the defendant to talk with him, and observed that his clothing
was covered with "beggar-lice." In the ensuing conversation, the defendant revealed that he had a criminal record, that he was taking a
short-cut from a motel to town, that he was in the city attempting to
persuade his wife to rejoin him in Atlanta where he had a job. The officer thereupon arrested the defendant for the following reason, according to the court:
He thus arrested the plaintiff in error because of his looks and
the time of day it was, around 4:00 a.m., and that he was not
more than a block and a half from ;the scene of the burglary
walking down the road, and the plaintiff in error was an exconvict and looked suspicious and his pants were covered with
"beggar-lice."10 8
In a search incident to the arrest, a screwdriver was found which was
introduced in evidence against the defendant. The court held that the
facts known to ;the officer established probable cause for an arrest.' 09
It is extremely difficult to objectify a practical constitutional standard
of probable cause. 110 At best, one can examine the relevant Supreme
Court decisions and thereby develop some sensitivity to the minimum
level of information requisite for a finding of probable cause. Granting
the existence of a large gray area in which appellate courts are unlikely
to disturb the determination of the presence of probable cause, the present case is at best at the outer limits of constitutional permissibility.
The fact that the defendant ultimately was found guilty of the crime
for which he was arrested"' of course has no bearing on the validity of
108. Id. at 604. The presence of the "beggar-lice" was considered significant because
there was a field grown up in weeds behind the burglarized building.
109. The court employed some extremely unfortunate language in reaching its
decision: "The man is still being protected by our Constitution but under the
circumstances of what he was doing then and what had happened which this
officer was investigating he lost the right of any protection he had under our
Constitution and the Federal Constitution, Amendment Four, because of where
he was at the time, 4:00 o'clock in the morning, he certainly looked so suspicious
that unquestionably he should have been arrested." 425 S.W.2d at 607 (emphasis
supplied). Clearly it is incorrect to suggest that this or any defendant loses his
It is
right under the fourth amendment because of "what he is doing."
furthermore beyond question that "suspicion," no matter how strong, is not
equivalent to probable cause, although such is the implication of this statement
by the court. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
110. "In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities; they are factual and practical considerations of every day life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
Ill. Actually, the defendant was initially charged with vagrancy, which could lead
to questions as to the reasonableness of the search incident to the arrest. How-
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the arrest.
Construing the evidence in favor of the prosecution, the
only facts giving rise to suspicion are the proximity in time and place of
the defendant to the offense, the hour of the day, and the presence of
the "beggar-lice." The defendant's criminal record is not relevant to the
determination of probable cause." 2 While it is clear that under the
authority of the Terry decision the officer was justified in stopping the
defendant, it would not appear that anything divulged at the time of
that encounter raised the level of suspicion to probable cause. 113 Three
prior decisions are cited by the court in substantiation of the conclusion
reached, but in each instance it clearly appears that the information
known to the officer was far more incriminating than in the present
11 4
case.
At common law, an arrest could be made for a misdemeanor, without
a warrant, only if it was committed in the presence of the arresting

ever, the court held that notwithstanding the nominal charge, the true reason
for arrest was for burglary, in regard to which there was probable cause.
112. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964). Also, Norfolk v. State, 4 Md. App. 52,
56, 241 A.2d 189, 191 (1968), where the court said, "We think that even a person
with a criminal record can carry a screwdriver on a well lit street at 4:15 in
the morning without being subject to arrest."
113. Cf. Commonwealth v. Howell, 213 Pa. Super. 33, 245 A.2d 680 (1968); People
v. Leos, 71 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1968).
114. In Smith v. State, 155 Tenn. 40, 290 S.W. 4 (1927), a policeman approached an
automobile parked in an alley and shown his flashlight in it, revealing several
five gallon tins. The rear seat cushion was disarranged, suggesting an attempt
to hide something. The officer then entered the car and found the tins to be
empty, but under the cushion he discovered nine one-gallon tins of whisky.
The owner of the car arrived shortly thereafter and was arrested for the
unlawful possession and transportation of liquor.
In Suggs v. State, 156 Tenn. 303, 300 S.W. 4 (1927), an officer was informed
of numerous complaints as to the transportation of whisky in the vicinity of a
school. He stationed himself at a nearby point and observed the defendant
drive up in a car, take a fruit jar from the rear of the car, conceal it beneath
his coat, and enter a building. The officer then approached the vehicle and
observed a fruit jar carton in the back. The car was searched and six halfgallons of whisky were discovered. Presumably the arrest occured on the
defendant's return.
In Massa v. State, 159 Tenn. 428, 19 S.W.2d 248 (1929), policemen were aiding
the driver of a stalled car when they detected the odor of mash and corn
whisky coming from a nearby building. Entering the building, they discovered
2,000 gallons of mash, 55 gallons of whisky, and a 250 gallon copper still. The
defendant thereupon entered and admitted he was the owner. He was convicted of the possession of a still and manufacturing whisky.
In all of these cases, there is no question but that the officers had probable
cause to make an arrest at the time of the arrest. In each instance, the police
had discovered the actual fruits of the offense charged and had identified these
fruits with the defendant. In contrast, in the present case the search of the
defendant apparently revealed no evidence of anything removed from the
premises of the tire company. Furthermore, the three decisions all pre-date
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and approve warrantless searches which
today would be of questionable validity under the now-applicable standard of
the fourth amendment.
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officer. 115 However, this standard has not been recognized as one of
constitutional dimensions, and therefore may be modified by statute.' .a0
A newly enacted Tennessee statute provides for the issuance of traffic
citations by an officer investigating an accident where he has "reasonable
and probable grounds to believe that such person has committed" a
traffic offense. 11
2. Notice of Authority and Cause
When making an arrest an officer is required by statute to advise
In United
the accused of his authority and the cause of the arrest."
19
States v. Clemmons" defendant Clemmons entered a grocery store
and attempted to cash a stolen money order. The owner of the store
detected the money order as being stolen whereupon Clemmons ran
out of the store to an awaiting automobile. The license number of the
automobile was given to the police, and Clemmons and a companion,
both defendants in this case, were thereafter apprehended by state officers in the automobile. At the time of the arrest the defendants were
told merely that they were being arrested for "investigation." They contended the arrests were illegal by virtue of the failure to comply with
the state statute. While not literally a case of hot pursuit, the court
held that the arrest was so "closely proximate to the offense in time
and connecting facts" as 'to make the cause for arrest obvious and notice unnecessary. 120 The court held that no constitutional issue was
121
presented.
3. Amendment to Warrant
In Murff v. State122 -the defendant was charged with "driving while
under the influence of an intoxicant." The warrant did not specify that
he was driving a motor vehicle nor that the driving took place on a
public road, both essential elements of the offense.' 23 Over the defendant's objection, the trial judge allowed the prosecution to amend the
warrant to read correctly. On appeal, the court held that the warrant
did in fact charge an offense when read in its entirety. In addition to
115. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
116. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535 (1900); Lurie v. District
Attorney of Kings County, 56 Misc.2d 68, 71, 288 N.Y.S.2d 256, 261 (1968).
117. TENN.

CODE ANN. § 59-1019

(e)

(1968

Replacement).

118. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-806 (Supp. 1968). Compliance with this requirement is
excused where the suspect is caught in the commission of an offense or the
officer is in hot pursuit.
119. 390 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1968).
120. Id. at 409.
121. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
122. 425 S.W.2d 286 (Tenn. 1967).

123.

TENN.

CODE

ANN.

§ 59-1031

(1968 Replacement).
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the above quoted language the warrant went on to charge the defendant
with having been convicted of the same offense on three prior occasions. 124 The court held that from the entirety of the warrant the
1 25
offense charged could "be clearly inferred."
Furthermore, the court held that the amendment to the warrant
was properly allowed. While acknowledging that early decisions prohibited the amending of warrants, the court felt that the reason for this
rule no longer existed. 126 On rehearing, it was argued by the defendant
127
that while there was statutory authority for amendments in civil cases,
there was no such provision for criminal cases, and that this fact should
be recognized as an expression of legislative policy opposed to amendments in criminal cases.' 28 The court rejected this argument.' 29 Next
it was contended that according to statute, an indictment could be
amended only with the consent of the defendant, 3 0 and that this should
apply equally to arrest warrants. The court acknowledged that this
appeared to be the implication of the statute but observed that the court
had previously allowed amendments to indictments without the consent
of the defendant, notwithstanding the statute.'' Finally, it was argued
that this was the first case ever to allow an amendment to an arrest
warrant. The court responded that this was quite correct and that
it was pleased to have settled the matter.

124. The punishment for the offense is greater where the accused has prior convictions of the same offense. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1035 (1968 Replacement).
125. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-708 (1955). "Name of defendant-Offense stated.-The
warrant should specify the name of the defendant, but if it be unknown to
the magistrate, the defendant may be designated therein by any name. It should
also state the offense either by name, or so that it can be clearly inferred."
126. "The early cases, pronouncing against amendment of arrest warrants, arose out
of the conflict between the king who sought unhampered power to arrest, and
his subjects who sought with every reason to be free from such tyrranical (sic)
power. In modern times, when even the rule against double jeopardy has been
so modified as to permit amendments and substitutions in proceedings under
indictments and presentments, there is no reason for not freely allowing amendments and substitutions of trial warrants where a defendant elects to go to
trial upon such a warrant." 425 S.W.2d at 288.

127.

TENN.

CODE ANN.

§§ 19-425, 20-1504, 20-1505 (1955).

128. This is the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See generally,
2 SUTHERLAND, §§ 4915-4917.
129. "It is not reasonable to infer from the absence of a statutory provision for such
amendments a legislative intention to prevent this Court from exercising its
supervening jurisdiction as it has in this case. If we were bound to nonaction
by nonaction of the General Assembly we would be in a pitiful plight indeed."
425 S.W.2d at 289.
130. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1713 (1955). "Amendment of indictment.-An indictment may be amended by the consent of the defendant in all cases."
131. State v. Costen, 141 Tenn. 539, 213 S.W. 910 (1919); Holden v. State, 143 Tenn.
229, 227 S.W. 441 (1920); Bowmer v. State, 157 Tenn. 124, 6 S.W.2d 326 (1928).
(Apparently the court was not willing to consider that these cases were wrongly
decided in light of the inconsistent language in the statute.)
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E. Search and Seizure
1. "Frisking"
It is a common police practice at the time of an arrest to "frisk"
the suspect where the officer has reason to believe he might be harboring
a concealed weapon. Such a practice is accepted as a reasonable search
incident to an arrest. The power to frisk may also be exercised in
circumstances short of arrest. In Terry v. Ohio'82 after stopping three
men suspected of planning a robbery, though without probable cause
for their arrest, the officer frisked them and found, inter alia, a pistol
in ,the coat of the defendant. He was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon. The United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
finding the "frisking" reasonable under the circumstances.' 88
While acknowledging that such methods are a reasonable and necessary concomitant of police field investigation, it is clear that the pretense
of frisking cannot be used to carry out exploratory searches. In Sibron
v. New York,' 8 4 decided on the same day as Terry, the Court considered
the application of the New York stop-and-frisk statute.' 8 5 In the Sibron
case, when an officer approached a suspected narcotics offender, the
suspect reached into his pocket and the officer reached in the same
pocket, discovering an envelope of heroin. There was no indication that
the officer had reached into the pocket for the purpose of self-protection.
The Court held this action by the policeman to be an impermissible
exploratory search, going beyond the power approved in Terry.B1
132. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) See previous discussion supra, text accompanying notes 105
and 106.
133. "Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary
to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered
the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever
evidence of criminal activity he might find." 392 U.S., at 30.
134. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
135, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a.
"1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony
or any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter,
and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to
this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may
search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such
a weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime,
he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which
time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person."
(The Court did not reach a determination of the constitutionality of this statute.)
136. "The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the
only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception-the protection
of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man." 392 -U.S. at 65. In
a companion case, Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court avoided
determining whether particular police activity went beyond a frisk by finding
that there was probable cause to arrest, so that the officer could legitimately
carry out an incidental search.
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2. Items in Plain View
In Sneed v. State'8 7 officers had a warrant for the defendant's arrest
for armed robbery and were advised that he would be found at a local
hospital. They were unable to locate him but saw his car parked in
front of the hospital. Looking through the window, one of the officers
observed a pump rifle. He thereupon opened the door to the car and
seized it. On appeal, the prosecution conceded that the removal of the
rifle consti-tuted an illegal search but contended that there was enough
evidence without it to sustain the conviction. The court refused to
accept the state's concession, observing that if it did so it would have
no alternative but to reverse the conviction. Rather, the court held,
the search violated no constitutional right of the defendant since the
officers only seized that which was plainly visible. A series of cases
was cited, both federal and state, in support of this view. It would
appear, however, with one possible exception, 13s that all the cited decisions are distinguishable from the present case. Some of the cases
involved observations made or property seized while on the premises
with the consent of the occupant.'8 9 Others involved items seen or seized
incident to an arrest. 140 Still others involved observations which were
used to establish probable cause for arrest thereafter.' 4' One case in1 42
volved items seen while moving a car at the scene of an accident.
None involved, as did the present case, a trespass on property of the
defendant to seize the items observed. However, the search may be held
permissible here on the alternative theory that the location of the evidence in an automobile with the strong possibility that it would not remain there were the officers to first get a warrant makes the seizure
48
justifiable.1

137. 423 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1968).
138. State v. Allred, 16 Utah2d 41, 395 P2d 535 (1964) (Here a police car was
following the defendant, he turned into a driveway, parked his car and ran
away. The officers approached the car and observed incriminating evidence
on the front seat, which they took. The court held the property was seizable,
because the car had been abandoned. Even here, the present case may be
distinguished.)
Another cited case, People v. Buys, 42 Misc.2d 154, 246
N.Y.S2d 925 (1964), appears inapposite since it involved the special authority
of conservation officials to check clam boats.
139. United States v. McDaniel, 154 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1957); Chapman v. United
States, 346 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 909 (1965).
140. Miller v. United States, 356 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 384 U.S. 912
(1966); State v. Polton, 259 Ia. 435, 143 N.W.2d 307 (1966); State v. Baines, 394
S.W.2d 312 (Mo. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 992 (1966); State v. Chinn, 231
Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 393 (1962).
141. People v. Holloway, 230 Cal. App.2d 834, 41 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1964); State v.
Clifford, 273 Minn. 249, 141 N.W.2d 124 (1966).
142. Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965).
143. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948): "There are exceptional
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A similar question was raised in Chadwick v. State.144 However,
here the officer merely looked through the window of a car and at the
trial testified as to what he saw. The court had no difficulty in finding
that this did not constitute an illegal search.
3. Consent
A search and seizure which otherwise would be unconstitutional may
be legitimate where it is conducted with the consent of the party whose
right is in jeopardy. The validity of a search, therefore, may turn on
whether genuine consent has been given. In a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, Bumper v. North Carolina,145 officers went to
the home of a suspect and announced to his mother -that they had a
search warrant to search the house, although they did not exhibit any
document. The suspect's mother told them to "go ahead" and opened
the door. In -the kitchen, they found a rifle which was introduced in
evidence against the accused. It was later discovered that the officers
did not have a valid search warrant at the time of the search. The
Court held that the search could not be justified on the theory of
146
consent.
In United States v. Richardson,147 following the burglary of a bank.
a witness observed two men hide some money bags behind the bank.
Federal agents found the bags which contained silver coins. The coins
were removed, the bags filled with gravel, dusted with fluorescein powder
and returned to their hiding place. Thereafter the bags were removed,
and the agents located the person they believed to be the culprit in a grill.
They asked him if they could look at his hands under an ultra-violet
light, to which he consented. The examination revealed powder similar
to that placed on the bags. The defendant contended, inter alia, that
these activities constituted a violation of his fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court held
that the action by the agents in this case did not constitute a search. 148

144.
145.
146.

147.
148.

circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement
against the. right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for
search may be dispensed with. But this is not such a case. . . . The search was of
permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband
was threatened with removal or destruction."
429 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
391 U.S. 543 (1968).
"When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." Id. at 550.
388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968).
The court cited Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which held that
the taking of a blood sample over the protest oi the defendant was not un-

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Furthermore, if it be assumed that a search occurred, the court was of
the opinion that the defendant had voluntarily consented. The court
rejected the suggestion of the defendant that he had been tricked into
14 9
permitting the examination of his hands.
50
Rosenthal v. Henderson' was a habeas corpus proceeding wherein
the defendant was challenging the constitutionality of his conviction for
armed robbery by a Tennessee state court. According to the officers,
following the defendant's arrest, he voluntarily consented to their searching his apartment without a warrant. In this search a wallet was found
which had been taken from the victim of the robbery. The defendant
denied that he had given the officers permission to search his apartment.
He claimed that he had been physically abused in an effort to illicit a
confession and that he admitted having the wallet in question but that
he won it in a "crap game." The federal district court held that the
defendant had not knowingly and intelligently wavied his fourth amendment rights, and the court of appeals affirmed. An issue recognized but
not determinative in the principal case was whether an accused can
effectively waive his fourth amendment rights unless he has first been
advised of them. A few decisions have indicated that just as Miranda
v. Arizona' 5 ' requires a suspect to be advised of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination before he can effectively waive the
privilege, the same standard may be applied to waivers of the protection
of the fourth amendment. 152 Other courts have held that the Miranda
approach is applicable only to fifth amendment problems.' 53 The
Rosenthal decision, while rejecting a requirement of notice of rights as

149.

150.
151.
152.
153.

reasonable under the circumstances. The Schmerber decision was also authority
for the conclusion that this governmental activity did not violate the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the appearance of the
suspect's hands, as the blood sample, was not "of a testimonial or communicative nature", (Id. at 761), nor did it violate the sixth amendment right to
counsel (Id. at 765-66).
"Certainly, from his standpoint, he used poor judgment in giving such permission but it is the sort of poor judgment from which the law does not protect. He gambled on his ability to convince the officer of his innocence.
He set the stage and selected the role which he would play; he cannot now cornlain that he overplayed his part. The officers were under no duty to advise
im of the propensities of fluorescein nor that it fluoresces under ultraviolet
light. They were under no duty to inform him that the money bags had been
dusted with fluorescein powder or what they expected to find from the examination of his hands." 388 F.2d at 845.
389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968).
384 U.S. 486 (1966).
See, e.g., United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966); U.S. v. Blalock,
255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. Modesacki, 280 F. Supp. 633
(D. Del. 1968).
Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1968); State v. McCarty, 199 Kan.
116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967), partially vacated 392 U.S. 308, (1968); State v. Forney, 181
Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967), aff'd 182 Neb. 802, 157 N.W.2d 403 (1968).
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a condition precedent to a valid consent search, does acknowledge that
such is a factor to be considered. 154 Bumper v. North Carolina' 5 is
conspicuous for its silence on this issue. While it was determined there
that valid consent had not been given, there was no implication that
the Court considered the problem analagous to the Miranda situation.
Rather, the analysis of the Court presents a closer analogy to the voluntary-involuntary test for confessions.
4. Reasonableness
When a warrantless search is justified as being incident to an arrest,
the issue may arise as to whether it is reasonably incident thereto. An
area of particular concern has been searches of automobiles. In 1964,
the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Preston v. United
States,'5 6 in which the defendant and two companions, seated in a parked
automobile, were arrested for vagrancy. The car was not searched at the
time of the arrest but was towed to a garage. Some time after the
suspects had been booked officers went to 'the garage and searched the
car, finding two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. Later, they
gained access to the trunk of the car and found several items intended
for use in a robbery. The Court acknowledged that what might be
unreasonable in regard to the search of a house might be reasonable in
regard 'to a motor vehicle. Still, searches of motor vehicles are protected by the fourth amendment, and "once an accused is under arrest
and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant,
is simply not incident to the arrest."' 5 7 The search in this case was,
therefore, unreasonable.
A similar problem arose in 1966 in Cooper v. California,155 where
the defendant was arrested for a narcotics offense. His vehicle was
impounded by the police but not searched until a week later, at which
time incriminating evidence was found. The Court found the case
distinguishable from Preston and upheld the seizure. Here it was not
contended that the search was incident to an arre~t. Rather, the prosecution relied on a state statute which authorized the seizure of any
vehicle used in connection with a narcotics offense "to be held as evi154. "The failure to so advise might have more weight in one case than in another.
To advise a person with experience or training in this field that he has the
right to refuse consent would be a waste of words. To fail to so advise
another, who by low mentality or inexperience is obviously ignorant of his
rights, might in some cases be decisive. Other cases would doubtless fall
between these two extremes." 389 F.2d at 516.
155. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
156. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
157. Id. at 367.
158. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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dence until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered." 159 The
Court recognized that the existence of statutory authorization did not
preclude a finding of constitutional unreasonableness, but here, unlike
Preston, the seizure of the car was closely related to the reason for the
defendant's arrest. Having legal custody of the automobile, the police
were not precluded from searching it.
Two recent federal cases have required a consideration of the reasonableness of automobile searches. In DiMarco v. Greene160 the defendant,
on parole, was observed by the police seated in a car driven by one
DiSanto, known by the police to be an unemployed ex-convict. DiSanto
left the car and entered a tavern. The police then approached the defendant and advised him that he was under arrest for a parole violation.
One of the officers opened the door to the car, flashed a light inside,
and observed burglar's tools. They then opened the trunk and found an
electric drill. DiSanto had disappeared through the rear door of the
tavern. The police placed the car in a garage, and the following day a
garage attendant notified them of finding a pistol under the seat, which
they confiscated. The defendant was convicted of burglary, safe tampering, armed robbery, and carrying a concealed weapon. On appeal the
validity of the seizure of the pistol was challenged. The court held,
first, that the discovery of the pistol was not the result of a search' 6 '
162
and, second, if it was a search it was lawful as incident to an arrest.
The latter rationale would appear incorrect as the facts presented are
more closely analagous to Preston than to Cooper,
In Kimbro v. Henderson'63 the defendant was arrested for murder
at his place of employment. The police impounded his automobile and
subsequently searched it for evidence which was introduced at his trial.
The court acknowledged the similarity of the case to Preston but held
that it was distinguishable, because here "the automobile was an integral part of the crime of which he was convicted."' 64 Furthermore,
159. CAL.

HEALTH

&

SAFETY

CODE

§

11611

(1964).

160. 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967).
161. Although it is not entirely clear, apparently the point is that the discovery by
the garage attendant is not governmental action. See Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921); Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied 89 S.Ct. 136 (1968).
162. "Only a cursory search was made by the police at the scene because of conditions then and there existing. The police officers, instead of the attendant,
could have made the search at the garage on the following day while the
car was still in their custody and where a search would have been more conveniently made and better performed." 385 F.2d at 561.

163. 277 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
164. Id. at 553. "The crime for which a person is arrested is a significant factor
in the determination of the reasonableness of a subsequent search and seizure of
an automobile impounded, or taken into custody, by the police at the time of
a person's arrest." Id.
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the court observed that there was a large volume of evidence in addition
to that contested which supported the conviction, whereas in the
Preston case the conviction was based largely on the challenged evidence. 165
5. Particularity of Affidavit
When an affidavit is presented to a magistrate to obtain a search
warrant, it is essential that the affidavit not merely state the conclusions
of the officer requesting the warrant. 166 Rather the affidavit must
contain a statement of facts which the magistrate may examine in order
to form an independent judgment as to the existence of probable
cause.1 67 In Naples v. Maxwell'6 8 an affidavit requesting a search
warrant was presented to a magistrate which clearly was no more particular than that disapproved in Aguilar.169 The magistrate so concluded,
and then inquired of the detectives if they had any further information.
On the basis of the exchange, the magistrate added two sentences to the
affidavit, 17 0 and then issued the warrant. The court held that the
affidavit as amended was sufficient and that it was clear that the
magistrate had made a conscientious independent determination of the
71
presence of probable cause.'
165. Apparently the court is suggesting implicitly that even if this be considered an
illegal search, the harmless error rule should be applied. The application of
the harmless error rule to the introduction of illegally seized evidence has not
been resolved by the United States Supreme Court. But see Black, J., dissenting,
in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), advocating the application of
the rule. And see People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 384 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1963), applying the rule.
Also of interest is the decision of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals,
Edwards v. State, 3 CRIM. L. RTR. 2240 (June 24, 1968). The defendant was
arrested by a sheriff for driving while intoxicated. The entire car was searched
except for the trunk. The defendant was then driven to jail in his own car.
Thereafter, the sheriff learned that the defendant was a moonshiner, and he
searched the trunk of the car, discovering illegal liquor, on which the present
conviction was based. The court held that the search of the car was unlawful.
166. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
167. In the Aguilar case, the Court found the following affidavit inadequate: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe
that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale
and use contrary to the provisions of the law." Id. at 109.
168. 393 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1968).
169. "The affiant says he has good reason to believe and does believe that the aforesaid property or some part thereof is still kept or concealed at the place aforesaid, and that there is urgent necessity for the search thereof to be made in the
(nighttime) or (daytime). This affidavit is based on the facts as follows: that
affiant has received information which he believes to he reliable and true, that
the above named items, or a part thereof, are being unlawfully kept on said
premises in violation of law." 393 F.2d at 616.
170. "Informant states that there is a secret room in cellar. Admitted to officers
that he is a part of the Naples gambling operation." Id.
171. The lower court had determined that Aguilar was retroactive in its application.
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F. Right to Counsel
1. Effective Assistance
With the right to counsel, at least in felony cases, firmly established, 172 the judicial focus of attention has shifted to the quality of
assistance the defendant received in the defense of his case. By and
large, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have not been sympathetically received by the courts. Occasionally decisions have been
reversed where appointed counsel had inadequate time to prepare the
case. 173 However, State ex rel. Edmondson v. Henderson' 74 indicates
that time limitations alone will not suffice to demonstrate ineffective
assistance. There it was alleged that appointed counsel did not consult
with the defendant until a day before his trial for armed robbery. The
court held that in the absence of any allegation of prejudice or potential
benefit from the earlier appointment of counsel, the contention need
not be further considered.
Where a defendant quarrels with the manner of preparation of the
case or the trial tactics employed by his appointed counsel, it is a rare
case in which an appellate court will attempt to evaluate his performance.
In State ex rel. Barnes v. Henderson' 75 the court was unimpressed by the
defendant's complaint that his counsel had not interviewed the victim of
a criminal assault. Similarly a defendant's complaint that his counsel
had previously represented two of the witnesses for the prosecution and
therefore did not cross-examine them vigorously enough was dismissed
by the court in McGowen v. State' 76 as "no more than a gratuitous
condemnation of the attorney."' 177 The decision of an attorney not to
request a change of venue was viewed as a matter of discretion in
Morton v. Henderson.'78 Three recent decisions suggest that effective
assistance of counsel may be presumed where the attorney has a high
reputation for effective representation. 1 79

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

The Court of Appeals did not decide this issue since the affidavit satisfied the
Aguilar standard in any event.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See Annot., Accused's Right to
Counsel under the Federal Constitution-Supreme Court Cases, 18 L.Ed.2d 1420
(1968).
See, e.g., Martin v. Commonwealth, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966); Twiford v.
Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967). But cf. United States ex rel. Mathis v.
Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968).
421 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1967).
423 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1968).
427 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1968).
Id. at 561.
389 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1967).
One recipient of these plaudits was attorney Hugh Stanton, the Public Defender
of Shelby County. In State ex rel. Doyle v. Henderson, 425 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn.
1968), the defendant objected to the failure of counsel to effect an appeal.
The court responded: "The writer of this opinion has known Mr. Hugh
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18 0
Beginning with the 1963 decision of State ex rel. Dych v. Bomar,
the Tennessee courts have drawn a distinction in effective assistance of
counsel cases between appointed counsel and retained counsel. 8 1 The
theory of this distinction is that in order for a constitutional deprivation
to occur there must be some form of state action. Where counsel has
been appointed, his performance is attributable to the state, but where
the defendant is represented by privately retained counsel there is no
state action, and therefore any shortcomings of counsel's performance
are a risk which the defendant has assumed.18 2 At most, if a defendant
is dissatisfied with the services of his retained counsel, it is his duty
to so advise the court of his dissatisfaction. If the trial judge elects to
do nothing in response to the defendant's objection, he may thereafter
be able to attribute the failure of counsel to state action. This distincx83
tion was adhered to in a series of decisions during the past year.

180.
181.
182.
183.

Stanton for over thirty years and knows as a matter of fact that he is one of
the most conscientious men he has ever known as well as one of the best
criminal lawyers in the State. . . . Mr. Stanton is a man of much experience
and is not a 'babe in the woods' in a trial of such cases, so if there had been
the slightest chance of a reversal or of any rights being protected on behalf of
this man he would have certainly answered the trial judge in the affirmative
and an appeal would have been perfected." Id. at 595. In State ex rel Lawrence
v. Henderson, 433 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968), attorney Stanton was
referred to as "a lawyer of extensive experience and great ability and unquestioned integrity and fidelity to the cause of his clients." Id. at 99.
In State ex rel. Gann v. Henderson, 425 S.W.2d 616 (Tenn. 1968), the court
made the following statement in response to the defendant's contention of
ineffective assistance of counsel: "Mr. Jared Maddux has been State Chairman
of the American Legion as well as Lieutenant Governor of the State and has
served admirably in a number of very hard cases and tried them well as this
Court is willing and able to testify. He knows what he is doing." Id. at 617.
Perhaps all three of these decisions are correct, although the Doyle case would
appear to present the very dilemma apprehended in Anders v. California (see
infra text accompanying notes 186 to 190), and doubtless t he attorneys are well
deserving of the praise conferred. However, it would seem unfortunate to
leave the impression, as these decisions do to some degree, that the performance
of counsel being infallible, there is no need for a consideration of the merits
of the defendant's complaint. Indeed, in retrospect the defendants in these
cases may have cause to wonder whether they were fortunate to have the
assistance of such effective attorneys.
213 Tenn. 699, 378 S.W.2d 772 (1963). See also State ex rel. Johnson v. Heer,
219 Tenn. 604, 412 S.W.2d 218 (1966).
The same distinction has been made by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382
U.S. 883 (1965).
See criticism by Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J., in Morris v. Florida,
89 S. Ct. 84 (1968).
In re Johnson, 277 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1967); State ex rel Gann v. Henderson, 425 S.W.2d 616 (Tenn. 1968); McGovern v. State, 427 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn.
1968). State ex rel. Donahue v. Russell, 429 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn. 1967).
Cf. Bible v. State, 4 CRIM. L. RPT. 2101 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 1, 1968):
Walker, J., "Here the defendant was forced to go to trial represented by counsel
whom he had discharged and who were selected by the Court over his objection.
We think that the Court abused its discretion in appointing the discharged
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2. On Appeal
In 1967 in Anders v. California'84 the United States Supreme Court
established a vigorous standard for counsel in pursuing an appeal of a
defendant's conviction. The Court said,
The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and
fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of
an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of
amicus curiae .

. .

. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be

wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should
so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That
request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to
85
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.1
Because of this affirmative duty to come forward with any conceivable
issues which would favor the defendant, the holding of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee in State ex rel. Doyle v. Hendersona88 would seem
questionable. There the defendant's appointed counsel had, in the
presence of the defendant, responded negatively when the trial judge
asked if he wished to appeal. The court held that the defendant had
raised no objection to his counsel's response.
When such is done it seems to us that this clearly constitutes
an oral waiver of appeal. .

. Mr. Stanton is a man of much

experience and is not a "babe in the woods" in a trial of such
cases, so if there had been the slightest chance of a reversal or of
any rights being protected on behalf of this man he would have
certainly answered the trial judge in the affirmative and appeal
would have been perfected.187
Yet it is just this type of presumption which was being condemned in
the Anders case. Indeed the California procedure which had been
followed in that case required more than the informal "waiver" in
Doyle. The California procedure required that counsel thoroughly study
the record and if he found no meritorious grounds for appeal he would
so advise the court. Thereafter the appellate court would determine
from its own review if counsel's conclusion was correct. The United
States Supreme Court found this procedure inadequate.18 8 The Tennessee court acknowledges having examined the Anders decision but
finds it inapplicable "because clearly under this record there was no

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

counsel over his protest, and that he was fundamentally prejudiced in his
defense."
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Id. at 744 (emphasis supplied).
425 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1968). Noted in 35 TENN. L. REV. 693 (1968).
Id. at 595.
"California's procedure did not furnish petitioner with counsel acting in the
role of advocate nor did it provide that full consideration and resolution of
the matter as is obtained when counsel is acting in that capacity." 386 U.S.
at 743.
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arguable -thing that could have been presented to the appellate court."' 8 9
It would seem that such bootstrapping is the very thing being frowned
upon in Anders. To date, there has been no suggestion that a violation
of Anders may be dismissed as harmless error. 19 0 As Anders involved a
defendant represented by appointed counsel, it has been held that its
standard does not apply when the defendant has retained counsel.' 9 1
G. Confessions
1. Failure to Respond to Accusation
In a significant footnote to the Miranda decision, 192 the United
States Supreme Court held,
[I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his
Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial
interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial
,the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of
accusation. 19 8
Such a problem was the central issue in O'Brien v. State.'9 4 The defendant and one Sinclair were stopped by customs agents in Laredo, Texas.
A search revealed some twenty money orders. Sinclair told the agents
he had obtained them from the defendant. The agents then asked the
defendant if they belonged to him; he responded that he did not care
to make a statement. At his trial for concealing stolen property an
agent was allowed to testify that the defendant did not deny Sinclair's
statement. Without referring to the Miranda decision, 195 the court
observed that as a general rule the failure to deny an incriminating
statement made in one's presence is admissible as evidence of his
acquiescence in its truth. 19 6 Here, however, the defendant was asserting a legal right to remain silent and the court held it would not be
reasonable to interpret this as an admission of guilt. Therefore the

189. 425 S.W.2d at 596.
190. Of course, if the defendant requests counsel to appeal his case, clearly he has
been deniedhis right if counsel fails to do so. State ex rel. Green v. Henderson,
421 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. 1967).
A recent decision, Ward v. State, 4 CiuM. L. RPTR. 2013 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 4, 1968), held that the defendant received inadequate assistance of counsel
both at his trial and on appeal. Another recent decision held that a defendant
who escaped from custody pending his appeal thereby waived his right to appeal.
Trent v. State, 3 CRIM. L. RPT. 2378 (Tenn. Crim. App., July 16, 1968).
191. In re Johnson, 277 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
192. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
193. Id. at 468 n.37.
194. 426 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn. 1968).
195. There is no indication in the report of the case whether the trial occurred
before or after the decision of Miranda.
196. The court cited Phelan v. State, 114 Tenn. 483, 88 S.W. 1040 (1904).
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judgment was reversed. The result is thus consistent with ,the standard
established by Miranda.'97
2. Method of Advising of Rights
The Miranda decision specifies the manner in which an accused is
to be advised of his constitutional rights.1 98

A growing number of cases

require a determination of whether the warnings given the accused
substantially complied with these requirements.1 99 In Shannon v.
State200 the defendant signed a waiver which read:
I have also been told that I have the right to call a lawyer or
have one called for me and have him present.
197. A recent yet-unreported decision also involving this issue is deserving of mention.
The defendants were travelling salesmen, convicted of kidnapping based upon
the removal of a schoolboy from a school bus, because they were irritated with
the boy's throwing papers from the bus. The defendants were arrested and
fully advised of their rights. The father of the boy confronted the defendants
at the jail and asked them why they had done it. Defendant Morford responded,
"We were going to take him off and beat the Hell out of him and teach him
some damn manners." Defendant Vanatta didn't say anything. This silence
was emphasized by the trial court to the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals,
Oliver, J., reasoned as follows: "Notwithstanding the fact that Morford was
not being interrogated by any officer or other official at the time he made
his statement, nevertheless, all the defendants were then and there in custody in
the jail in the presence of the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers and
the general sessions judge and the parents and sister of the victim, and the
atmosphere was very tense as a result of the victim's father undertaking to
interrogate these defendants and provocative statements by the father and
sister. So, in this context and under those circumstances, the fact that they
were not being interrogated by the Sheriff or other law enforcement officer
or official can have no determinative bearing or effect upon this question....
Considered in the light of this situation, and from the standpoint of the
constitutional rights of the defendants, this was for all practical purposes an incustody interrogation, albeit the victim's enraged father was improperly permitted to conduct an inquisition which resulted in Morford's angry retort.
In our view of the matter, after having been advised by a judicial officer of
his constitutional right to remain silent, and exercising that right as he understood it, this defendant was not required to break his silence and speak up
in protest and denial of Morford's statement." Vanatta v. State, 3 CRIM, L.
RPTR. 2269 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 7, 1968). See also Galasso v. State, 207
So.2d 45 (Fla. 1968).
198. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed." 384 U.S. at 444.
199. In United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968), it was held that telling a
defendant "he didn't have to make a statement" was not equivalent to advising
him of his right to remain silent, nor was the statement that "he could consult
an attorney prior to any question" adequate notice that he had the right to the
presence of an attorney. Advising the suspect that he has the right to consult
with an attorney "at anytime" was held inadequate notice of the right to the
presence of an attorney in Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1968).
Nor is telling the defendant he has the right "to contact" an attorney sufficient.
Duckett v. State, 3 Md. App. 563, 240 A.2d 332 (1968).
200. 427 S.W. 2d 26 (Tenn. 1968).
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The court held that this did not satisfy the requirements of Miranda.201
In Floyd v. State202 the defendant was advised, inter alia, as follows:
We have no way of furnishing you a lawyer but one will 208
be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.
Clearly, this warning does not meet the requisites of Miranda either,
but the court affirmed the conviction because the defendant did not
object to the introduction of the confession at the trial. 204 It is arguable
that any error was harmless in any event because the court noted the
defendant was represented by retained counsel, and other portions of
the notice acknowledge the right to presence of retained counsel during
205
interrogation.
3. Fruits of an Illegal Confession
In Shannon v. State206 the accused, suspected of murder, was both
illiterate and an alcoholic. He was taken to a motel for questioning by
three officers who after some effort persuaded him to submit to a lie
detector test. He was advised.that he did not pass it and thereafter
was interrogated for some five or six hours during which time a confession was obtained. After he was placed in jail two knives allegedly connected with the crime were shown to him, and he made incriminating
statements with respect to them. He also made certain incriminating
statements during the booking procedure. At some time, though it is
not clear when, the defendant signed a waiver, which proved to be
invalid. 207 The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that
201. In a surprising outburst the court admonished law enforcement officials for
their failure to fully apprise accused of their rights: "The sooner it is realized
by all concerned that the Miranda guarantees must be afforded an accused, in
full good faith and with intention on the part of the interrogators to comply
fully therewith, in the spirit in which these tests are laid down and required,
the sooner the time will come when it will not be necessary for this Court
to reverse as it must do in this case. Let it be noted that the concern of this
Court is not to favor a defendant but to see that the scales of justice be in
balance between him and the State, which cannot be if the constitutional
guarantee of Miranda can be withheld by its officers." Id. at 29. For a similar
decision, see Lloyd v. State, 3 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2145 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 6,
1968).
202. 430 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
203. Id. at 891. This is but a small extract of the war..ing given, which is set out
at length in the opinion. However, at no point in the warning was the
suspect advised that he had the right to the presence of appointed counsel
during interrogation.
204. However, the virtually identical warning was held adequate in Reed v. State,
3 CRIM. L. RPT. 2519 (Tenn. Crim. App., Sept. 4, 1968).
205. The possibility of the application of the harmless error rule to Miranda violations has not yet been broached by the United States Supreme Court. But
see Commonwealth v. Wilbur, 231 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. 197), cert. denied 390

U.S. 1010 (1968), involving a problem similar to mne one here discussed.
206. 427 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1968).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 200 and 201.
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it was coerced by reference to the failure to pass the lie detector test.
The subsequent incriminating statements were admitted. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the later statements were equally inadmissible, since they were "patently the fruit of the earlier one." 2 08
A unique fruit of the poisonous tree problem was presented in
Harrison v. United States.20 9 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder, but on appeal the conviction was reversed because an illegally obtained confession had been introduced against the defendant.
On retrial the confession was not admitted, but the court did allow the
prosecutor to read portions of the defendant's testimony at the previous
trial. The defendant objected to the admission of the testimony on the
theory that he had been induced to testify at the prior trial only because
he felt it necessary to rebut the confession. The Supreme Court acknowledged the general rule of evidence that a defendant's testimony
at a former trial is admissible in a subsequent proceeding. Here, however, the question was whether the testimony was induced by the illegal
confession, in which event it was the fruit of that confession and could
not be introduced at a subsequent trial. Since the government had been
guilty of illegal action, the burden of proof rested with it to show that
the confession did not induce the testimony, a burden it had failed to
210
satisfy.
4. Application of Miranda to Retrials
The Miranda decision is applicable only to "cases commenced after"
the date of its decision, June 13, 1966.211 In the past year, two decisions
were handed down by the Supreme Court of Tennessee involving retrials subsequent to Miranda where the first trial was prior to
Miranda.2 12 The court held that Miranda did not apply under these
2 13
circumstances.

208. Cf. the .case of Robinson v. State, 2 CRIM. L. RPT. 2350 (Tenn. Sup. Ct., Jan.
5, 1968), where the defendant made a confession to the police which was
determined by the trial court to be inadmissible. Shortly thereafter he made a
confession to newspaper reporters, which was admitted at his trial. The
appellate court held this latter confession to be admissible.
209. 392 U.S. 219 (1968).

210. While the Harrison case dealt with a confession which was illegal because of a
violation of a federal rule of procedure, it would appear equally applicable to
confessions found inadmissible for constitutional reasons.
211. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.s. 719, 733 (1966).
212. Patten v. State, 426 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1968); Murphy v. State, 426 S.W.2d
509 (Tenn. 1968).
213. Jurisdictions are split over this issue, the confusion arising from the meaning
of the phrase "cases commenced after" used in the Johnson decision. For a discussion of the problem, see Note, 36 TENN. L. REV. 58 (1968).
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5. Determination of Admissibility
In McCravey v. State,21 4 when alleged confessions of the two defendants were offered into evidence, the defendant objected, challenging
their admissibility. The trial judge thereupon excused the jury and
heard testimony of the officers who had obtained -the confessions to the
effect that the Miranda warnings had been given. At the conclusion of
the presentation, the trial court refused to allow the defendants to testify
as to the circumstances under which the confessions were made, stating
that such testimony could be given -to the jury for its consideration.
Primarily on the authority of Jackson v. Denno215 and United States v.
Carigan216 the court reversed, holding that the defendants should have
been afforded an opportunity to testify at this point regarding the ad2 17
missibility of their confessions.
6. Use of Co-Defendant's Confession in Joint Trial
In Bruton v. United States218 the defendant challenged the admission
of a confession of a co-defendant, which confession inculcated the defendant, at a joint trial. The jury had been instructed that the confession of the co-defendant was to be disregarded in the determination
of the defendant's guilt. Overruling the prior decision of Delli Paoli v.
United States, 21 9 the United States Supreme Court held that because of
the "substantial risk" that the jury considered the confession in determining the defendant's guilt, notwithstanding the cautionary instruction,
the admission of the confession was improper in tha-t the defendant was
deprived of the right to confront his accusers in accordance with the
sixth amendment.
H. Grand Jury
1. Racial Discrimination
Just as it is a denial of equal protection to systematically exclude
members of a race from a grand jury panel, 220 so it is equally unconstitutional to manipulate the make-up of the grand jury so that a designated percentage of members of a race are selected. 22 1 In Bonds v.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

426 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1968).
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
342 U.S. 36 (1951).
Followed in Scalf v. State, 3 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2231 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 16,
1968).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
352 U.S. 232 (1957).
See Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947). And see State ex rel. Hathaway
v. Henderson, 432 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1968), where the principal was acknowledged, but no discrimination was proven.
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
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State222 the court examined a grand jury selection procedure in which
the letter "C" was written on all cards bearing the name of a Negro
which were placed in the jury selection box. 223.

Thereafter, when names

were drawn from the box, the commissioners saw to it that twenty-five
Negroes were included in each jury panel. The court held that this
procedure smacked of racial discrimination just as much as systematic
exclusion. The question was not whether any Negroes were actually
on the grand jury; the sole concern was with the manner in which
the grand jury members were selected.
I. Guilty Plea
1. Voluntarily and Understandingly Entered
The validity of a guilty plea entered in respect to two separate
charges was attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding in Rigby v.
Russell.224 The defendant was first charged with armed robbery, and
counsel was appointed to represent him. After consulting with the
defendant and witnesses, including the victim of the robbery, counsel
concluded that there was no defense to the charge and so advised the
defendant. He told him that armed robbery was a capital offense, although such a penalty was very unlikely, and recommended that he
enter a guilty plea and seek a minimum sentence. Counsel thereafter
consulted with the district attorney, and it was agreed that the latter
would recommend the minimum sentence of ten years if a plea of
guilty was entered. The defendant entered a guilty plea and received
a ten year sentence. In the meantime, however, while awaiting trial
on the armed robbery charge, the defendant had participated in an
attempted jail break. He was thus additionally charged with attempted
escape and assault with intent to murder. The date for trial on these
charges was some two weeks later than that on the armed robbery charge.
The same attorney represented the defendant on this charge, and again
he concluded that there was no defense available and so advised the
defendant. The defendant told him that he would like to enter a guilty
plea to the charges and again seek a minimum sentence. The district
attorney told his counsel that he would dismiss the escape charge and
would not oppose a minimum sentence on the assault charge, nor would
he oppose the sentence running concurrently with the armed robbery
sentence. Counsel advised the defendant of this agreement but explain222. 421 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1967).
22M. As the court noted, this procedure in and of itself was patently unconstitutional.
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1963); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773
(1964); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).

224. 287 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
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ed that the recommendation regarding a minimum sentence was not
binding on the jury, nor was the recommendation for the sentences to
run concurrently binding on the judge. The defendant entered a
guilty plea, and the jury imposed a minimum sentence. However, the
court ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the armed robbery
sentence.
In the present proceeding -the defendant contended that both guilty
pleas were invalid. The court held against the defendant in each instance. Since the failure of the defendant to have his sentence run
concurrently was the only matter which he did not receive as anticipated,
this would appear to be the strongest point at which he could attack the
pleas. In this regard the court said,
However, whether the defendant received the benefit of the
recommendation of leniency does not of itself establish that the
plea was voluntary or involuntary, understood or not understood,
valid or invalid. A mistaken or involuntary plea does not become valid because the bargain inducing it was good or bad, kept
or unkept. The issue accordingly remains whether, in the light
of all the circumstances, including any plea bargaining, the 22plea
5
of guilty was freely, voluntarily and understandingly entered.
Notwithstanding the court's statement that whether the bargain is
kept is not determinative of the validity of the plea, it is generally true
that where the defendant receives punishment in excess of that bargained
for by counsel and prosecutor the plea will be held to be not "understandingly" entered. In the present case, however, the court was convinced that the defendant had been fully advised by his counsel of the
possibilities prior to his entering the plea, and among those possibilities
was the court's ordering the sentences to run consecutively. Thus the
defendant had elected to take his chances, at least within the spectrum
of potential results outlined to him by his counsel.
Having thus disposed of the case, the court took the opportunity to
comment on the source of the problem in the case.
This case points tip the hazards involved in the practice of
plea discussions or plea bargaining in criminal cases. Had there
been no such bargaining in this case, it is unlikely that the
proceeding would ever have been filed. Although plea bargaining
appears to be a common practice in many courts, it has little to
recommend its use. Many prosecuting officers, if not courts,
appear to feel that it is a necessary and proper means of disposing
criminal cases expeditiously. That it expedites disposition of
cases may be true. That it is a necessary or proper means of doing
so is subject to serious question. Where the practice is followed,
the least that should be done is that the Trial Court should re225. Id. at 331.
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q uire a full disclosure upon the record of such negotiations and
into the voluntary and understandten conduct a careful2 inquiry
26
ing nature of the plea.

This passage reflects the widespread growing concern of many judges
and writers with the sub rosa procedure of plea bargaining which is
2 27
so much a part of the contemporary criminal process.
2. Requirement of Evidence to Determine Punishment
Until a 1967 amendment, Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-2310
provided:
Upon the plea of guilty, when the punishment is confinement
in the penitentiary, a jury shall be impaneled to hear the evidence
and fix the time of confinement,
unless otherwise expressly pro2 28
vided for by this Code.
During the past year, a series of habeas corpus petitions raised objections to the failure to comply with this statute in that no evidence
was submitted to the jury determining the punishment. In each instance,
the court held that at stake was a statutory right which the defendant
could waive. No constitutional right was in issue, and thus the judgments were not subject to a collateral attack by a petition for a writ
226. Id. at 381-82.
227. The court quoted from the American Bar Association's project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (tentative
draft, February 1967): "1.5 Determining voluntariness of plea. The court
should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining
that the plea is voluntary. By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel, the court should determine whether the tendered plea is the result
of prior plea discussions and a plea agreement, and, if it is, what agreement
has been reached. If the prosecuting attorney has agreed to seek charge or
sentence concessions which must be approved by the court, the court must
advise the defendant personally that the recommendations of the prosecuting
attorney are not binding on the court. The court should then address the
defendant personally and determine whether any other promises or any force
or threats were used to obtain the plea."
See also The Negotiated Plea of Guilty in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORTS: THE COURTS
9-13 (1967); NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNO-

CENCE WITHOUT TRIAL, ch. 6

(1966).
The yet-unreported decision, Owens v. Russell, 4 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2080 (Tenn.
Crim. App., October 4, 1968), held that a signed guilty plea does not foreclose
the defendant's later challenging it as being involuntary.
228. In 1967 the statute was amended by the following addition: "Provided however, that if the defense does not request a trial on his plea of guilty, and has
agreed to accept the punishment recommended in the case on the plea of
guilty, in the discretion of the court a r~sum of the facts of the case shall be
related to the jury by the state and stipulated and agreed to by the state
and the defense as being the substantial facts and evidence in the case, to be
considered by the jury as such facts and evidence, and the jury may then
approve the recommendation and be sworn to fix the punishment. In such
pleas of guilty by stipulation and agreement, the judge shall not be required
to charge the jury in writing, or otherwise." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (Supp.
1968).
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of habeas corpus.

22 9

The possibility of this argument being raised, even

280
on appeal, is now foreclosed by statutory amendment.

Trial
1, Trial by Jury
a. Right to
In Duncan v. Louisiana28s the United States Supreme Court extended the right to trial by jury to .the states. The scope of application
of the holding was left undecided. The defendant was charged with
an offense which, though classified as a misdemeanor, was punishable
by up to two years imprisonment and a fine. He was actually sentenced
to sixty days in prison and a fine of $150. The Court held that the
defendant was entitled to a trial by jury. It is dear that the determining
factor is the potential punishment, not ,the punishment .-which the defendant actually received. The Court observed that a jury -trial was
not mandatory for "petty" offenses, and indicated this would probably
include most crimes where the possible penalty was not in excess of six
months. For present purposes, the Court was content to hold that
where the crime is punishable by as much as two years in prison it
is not a petty offense and the accused is entitled to a trial by jury.
In a case decided the same day, Bloom v. Illinois,232 the Court also
held that the right to trial by jury extended to serious criminal contempts in state courts. Here the Court was confronted with a state
statute which provided no maximum punishment for criminal contempt.
Acknowledging that criminal contempt was not such a crime that demanded a jury trial irrespective of the punishment involved, the Court
concluded -that in this situation it could only judge the seriousness of
the matter by examining the punishment actually imposed. Here the
petitioner had received a two year sentence, and the Court thought he
was clearly entitled to a trial by jury.
In the only Tennessee decision concerning the right to trial by
jury it was held that there was nothing unconstitutional about a statute
which permitted a defendant to waive his right to trial by jury in a
23 3
felony case.

J.

229. State ex rel. Edmondson v. Henderson, 421 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. 1967); State
ex rel. Ingram v. Henderson, 423 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn. 1968); State ex rel. Barnes
v. Henderson, 423 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1968); State ex rel. Crumpler v. Henderson,
428 S.W.2d 800 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968); State ex rel. Underwood v. Henderson,
428 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968); State ex rel. Gage v. Russell, 431
S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968); State ex rel. George v. Henderson, 432
S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
230. See note 228 supra.
231. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

232. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
233. Seals v. Luttrell, 428 S.W.2d 312 (Tenn. 1968).
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b. Impartial Jury
In Witherspoon v. Illinois2 3 4 the United States Supreme Court con-

sidered the propriety of excluding from jury service for cause individuals
235
who expressed conscientious scruples against capital punishment.
The Court held that the exclusion of such individuals from the jury
deprived the defendant of due process of law.
[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital
punishment can do little more - and must do nothing less - than
express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question
of life and death. Yet, in a nation less than half of whose people
believe in the death penalty, a jury composed
exclusively of
2 36
such people cannot speak for the community.
The Court acknowledged that it would be permissible to exclude from
the jury all persons who would not even consider returning the death
penalty - such would simply go to insure a "neutral" jury - but to
exclude all who expressed any reservations about the death penalty
"crossed the line of neutrality."
Several state decisions have raised various issues as to the impartiality
of jurors. In Brown v. State237 the defendant objected to the fact that
one of the jurors sat on both his sanity hearing and the trial on the
merits. It was argued that the prior participation of the juror at the
sanity hearing affected his impartiality at the subsequent trial, and
that this destroyed the impartiality of the entire body. The court
found the present case distinguishable from a case in which a juror had
previously sat on a' prosecution of the defendant involving much the
same evidence.2 8 Rather, the court compared the problem to that raised
when a juror has obtained information concerning the defendant or the
crime from some independent source, such as a newspaper. In such
instances, the court noted, an admonition to the jury to consider only
the evidence heard from the witness stand afforded the defendant sufficient protection.23 9 Assumedly, all the jurors were properly instructed
on their responsibility in the trial of the present case, and the court was
persuaded to affirm the conviction.
234. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
235. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959), provided: "In

236.
237.
238.
239.

trials for murder it shall be

a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that
he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed
to the same."
391 U.S. at 519-520.
423 S.W,2d 493 (Tenn. 1968).
Apperson v. Logwood, 56 Tenn. 262 (1873).
Smith v. State, 205 Tenn. 502, 327 S.W.2d 308 (1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 990
(1960).

1969]

CRIMINAL LAW IN

TENNESSEE

In State ex rel. George v. Henderson240 the defendant entered pleas
of guilty to charges of rape and assault and battery with intent to commit rape. A jury was empaneled for the determination of punishment.
Prior to entering the guilty plea, an agreement had been reached between defense counsel and prosecutor as to the punishment which would
be recommended. The defendant challenged the trial procedure employed whereby the prospective jurors were required to commit themselves before being sworn to return the verdict recommended by the
prosecution. The defendant contended that this procedure totally
abrogated his statutory right to have his punishment determined by a
jury. 241 The court did not agree. Since the defendant had initiated
the negotiations with the prosecution which had resulted in a mutually
agreed -to sentence, he could not now object to a procedure which accomplished his purpose. 242 Furthermore, no objection was made at the
time of the empaneling of the jury.
In Hyatt v. State243 the defendant was convicted of the illegal transportation of liquor. Following the trial it was discovered that one of
the jurors had a son-in-law who was an alcoholic, and that the juror had
previously sworn out a search warrant to have the defendant's premises
searched for liquor in an effort to protect his relative. The court reversed the judgment holding that the presence of the juror on "the
jury raises a reasonable doubt in our minds as to whether these de2' 44
fendants have been tried by a fair and impartial jury.
With regard to a claim of general prejudice in the community, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fact that two hundred
and fifty jurors were examined on voir dire before a jury could be
selected did not prima facie indicate that the jury finally selected was
2 45
biased and prejudiced.
c. Alternate Juror
The Tennessee Constitution provides that "the right to trial by
jury shall remain inviolate." 246 In Grooms v. State2 47 the defendant was
convicted by a jury of thirteen members, and he contended that this
240. 432 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
241. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (Supp. 1968).
242. "The presiding fact is that the petitioner made his own bargain, deliberately
planned and obtained its final approval by a jury, and he is estopped to
repudiate it now by claiming that the procedure he adopted to accomplish his
own purpose was illegal, even if it were." 432 S.W.2d at 497.
243. 430 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. 1968).
244. Id. at 130.
245. Morton v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1967).
246. TENN. CONsT. art 1, § 6.
247. 426 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1968).
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was a violation of the constitution. "The right to trial by jury" was
held by the court to carry the common law meaning of "twelve good
and lawful men. ' 248 Thus, it had been held that a conviction by a jury
of less than twelve jurors was invalid.2 49 The court was of the opinion
that a -trial by a jury of more than twelve members was equally invalid
and reversed and remanded the case. Likely the problem arose in this
case because of a state statute authorizing the selection of an alternate
juror in certain cases in certain counties, who sits as a regular juror
through the case and is available should a regular juror become incapacitated. 250 However, if when the case reaches the point for submission to the jury the twelve regular jurors are still available for service,
the alternate juror should be discharged, and it is reversible error to
25 1
allow him in the jury room during deliberations.
d. Duty of Judge to Approve Verdict
In Halliburton v. State2 52 the defendant was convicted of rape. In
response to a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
contrary to the weight of the evidence, the trial judge said,
[F]or the Court to consider the matter further insofar as this
motion is concerned, I would have to step into the rights and
prerogatives set-up by the law for the jury, which is to hear the
acts and to give a verdict in accordance with those facts, and I
don't believe that the Court is warranted in doing anything like
clear
abuse of the jury's
that because I feel it would be a 25
3
authority and the judge's prerogative.
The trial judge has been characterized as a "thirteenth juror" in a
criminal case. 25 4 By virtue of this role, he is expected to "weigh
the evidence and pass upon the issues," and in denying a motion for a
new trial he must tacitly approve the verdict of the jury. As the statement of the trial judge in this case indicated that he had declined to
consider the verdict of the jury on its merits, the court was compelled
to reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

"By good and lawful men
248. Neely v. State, 63 Tenn. 174, 180 (1874).
is meant men 'esteemed in the community for their integrity, fair character,
and sound judgment.'" Id.
249. Bell v. State, 37 Tenn. 507 (1857); Bowles v. State, 37 Tenn. 360 (1858);
Willard v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S.W.2d 99 (1939) (all cited by the court
in the present case).
250. TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-222 (Supp. 1968).
251. Patten v. State, 426 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1968).
252. 428 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
253. Id. at 45.
254. Curran v. State, 157 Tenn. 7, 4 S.W.2d 957 (1928); Messer v. State, 215 Tenn.
248, 385 S.W.2d 98 (1964).
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2. Conflict of Interest
255
Several months prior to the trial in the case of Autry v. State,
the defendant had gone to a particular attorney to seek his assistance
in the defense. The defendant and his son testified that the case was
discussed for about an hour, during which the facts were revealed and
the witnesses were identified. The attorney did not accept the defense
of the case, however, because the parties were unable to agree on a fee.
When the defendant came to trial, the attorney in question appeared
as a special prosecutor. The defendant argued 'that since the prosecutor
had received confidential communications from him at a time when
they were dealing with each other in an attorney-client relationship,
he was thereby disqualified from participating in the trial in this capacity. The court recognized the general principle that an attorney cannot represent conflicting interests in a case, and that once an attorney
has received the confidence of a client he is thereby precluded from
serving interests adverse to those of the client. However, the court rejected the account of the facts as given by the defendant and concluded
that no confidential communications had passed between the parties
and that the mere discussion of proposed employment did not disqualify
the attorney from serving the prosecution. The statement of the law
by ,the court is quite accurate and is consistent with decisions from other
jurisdictions. 256 Discretion would suggest that whenever an attorney is
placed in a position where there is the possibility of the divulgence of
confidences, he should remove himself from any further participation
25 T
in the case adverse to the interests represented in this encounter.
3. Jury Instructions
A newly enacted statute provides for a directed verdict of acquittal
where insufficient evidence has been presented to warrant a conviction. 258 It was held to be reversible error to fail to provide the jury
with the written charge when -they retired to deliberate.2 59 It was also
held reversible error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury as to
a lesser included offense where there was some evidence which could
260
support such a finding.

255. 430 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
256. Several are cited by the court.
257. Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, Canon 9 (Preliminary Draft
1969), entitled "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety," although not dealing specifically with the problem in the present
case.

258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2529

(Supp. 1968).
259. McElhaney v. State, 420 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1967).
260. Prince v. State, 421 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. 1967).
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Determination of Degree of Murder

In State ex rel. Lockhart v. Henderson26' 1 the defendant plead guilty
to first degree murder and a jury was empaneled for the determination
of punishment. The jury returned as its verdict: "Fix the punishment
for the defendant at the term of not more than fifty (50) years in the
penitentiary." On appeal, the defendant objected to the absence in the
verdict of any indication of the degree of murder. Section 39-2404 of
the Tennessee Code Annotated provides:
The jury before whom the offender is tried, shall ascertain in
their verdict whether it is murder in the first or second degree;
and if the accused confess his guilt, the court shall proceed to
determine the degree of crime by the verdict of a jury, upon the
examination of testimony, and give sentence accordingly.
A host of decisions are cited by the court in which it was held that a
failure to specify the degree of murder in the verdict rendered it void.
Yet all these cases had the common characteristic, distinguishing them
from the present case, that the defendant had entered a plea of not
guilty. Here the defendant had plead guilty to first degree murder,
so it could be argued that the jury was making its determination within
the context of this stipulation of guilt.
The only case discovered by the court with some relevance to the
2 62
present issue was the 1951 decision of State ex rel. Brinkly v. Wright.
There the defendant entered a plea of guilty to an indictment of first
degree murder, and the jury indicated it found him guilty of first
degree murder. The defendant argued that the jury should only have
determined punishment-that the determination of the degree of
murder was for the court. On appeal it was held that a reasonable
interpretation of the statute required the jury to determine the degree
of murder. On the authority of this decision and the explicit language
employed in the statute, the court held in the present case that theverdict of the jury was void.
K. Punishment
1.

Cruel and Unusual

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Powell v. Texas2 63 afforded further development of the "status crime"
aspect of -the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. The status crime doctrine was first expounded in Robinson

261. 427 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn. 1968).
262. 193 Tenn. 26, 241 S.W.2d 859 (1951).
263. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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v. California.264 There the defendant had been convicted under a
California statute which made it a crime to "be addicted to the use of
narcotics." As California had interpreted this statute, a conviction (lid
not require any proof of use, possession, purchase or sale of narcotics.
If the prosecution could prove that the defendant was a drug addict,
then the offense was complete. The Supreme Court held that "a state
law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though
he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty
of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment
2 65
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Robinson decision potentially was of relatively minor significance, because statutes which impose criminal liability for a "status,"
pure and simple, as the California statute did, are exceedingly rare.
Questions were raised in lower courts thereafter, however, as to the
relevance of Robinson in cases where it was clear that the offense
charged was unavoidable because of the accused's status. For example,
if a defendant could not be convicted of being a drug addict, could a
drug addict be convicted of using narcotics? 2 16 In the Powell case, the
issue was whether an alcoholic could be convicted of public intoxication. 2 67 The defendant had appealed a $20.00 fine for being in a state
of intoxication in a public place, contending that he was an alcoholic.
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court, which represented the
views of four of its members. 268 The opinion reasoned that the case
did not fall within the rationale of the Robinson holding at all, because
the defendant had not been convicted of being a chronic alcoholic but

264. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
265. Id. at 667.

"It

is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would

attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might determine
that the general health and welfare require that the victims of these and

other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration.

But, in the light of contemporary human

knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punish-

ment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 666.
266. See Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 929
(1965), where the court declined to consider the possibility.
Borrero, 19 N.Y.2d 332, 227 N.E.2d 18, 280 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1967),

In People v.
the defendant

went a step further and argued as a defense to larceny that he stole only so that
he would have the funds necessary to satisfy his craving as a narcotics addict.
The court rejected the argument.
267. Two lower courts had previously reached this conclusion: Driver v. Hinnant,
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). Several state decisions had gone the other way.
268. Justice Marshall was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Harlan.
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rather of being in public while drunk. All that Robinson stood for,
according to these Justices, was that a defendant could only be convicted if he was accused of committing some act. Justice White concurred in the result reached by his four colleagues, but disagreed that the
Robinson rationale could not be extended to cover acts which were a
product of the "status" as well. 2 69 He voted to affirm the conviction
because he felt that public intoxication was not an inevitable consequence of being an alcoholic-i.e., the defendant could have as easily
have become intoxicated in the privacy of his own home. 2 70 Four
Justices 27 1 dissented, agreeing in theory with Justice White, but reaching a different conclusion on the facts, feeling that for all practical purposes the defendant was living in the public streets, and therefore the
2 72
connection between the status and the offense could be established.
It will be noted ,that although the "Opinion of the Court" gives a narrow
interpretation to the Robinson decision, five of the Justices are prepared
to extend the doctrine to cover offenses inseparable from the status, and
it was only Justice White's attitude toward the facts of the case that
prevented such an extension at this time.
2. Indeterminate Sentence Law
Section 40-2707 of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides ihat where
a defendant is convicted of a felony, the punishment for which is designated as within certain minimum and maximum terms, the jury is to fix
punishment as "imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than
273
--- years." The defendant in State ex rel. Crumpler v. Henderson
was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to "20 years in the

269. "If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics
... I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a compulsion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under a
different name. . . . Similarly, the chronic alcoholic with an irresistible urge
to consume alcohol should not be punishable for drinking or for being drunk."
392 U.S. at 548-49.
270. "Powell had a home and wife, and if there were reasons why he had to drink
in public or be drunk there, they do not appear in the record." Id. at 553. At
the same time, Justice White acknowledged that there are homeless alcoholics
in regard to whom it could be said that public intoxication is unavoidable.
271. Justices Fortas, Douglas, Brennan and Stewart.
272. The dissenters observed that the defendant had been convicted of public
intoxication 100 times since 1949. He worked at a tavern shining shoes for
$12.00 a week, which he used to buy wine. He did not contribute to the
support of his family. He drank wine every day, got drunk about once a
week, and then usually went to sleep on the sidewalk.
"[T]he essential
constitutional defect here is the same as in Robinson, for in both cases the
particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which he had no
capacity to change or avoid." 392 U.S. at 567.

273. 428 S.W.2d 800 (Tenn. Crim App. 1968).
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penitentiary." The defendant contended he should have received the
benefit of the above cited statute, which would allow credit for good
behavior to be deducted from his sentence. Armed robbery is a capital
offense, but the jury may commute the sentence to imprisonment for
from ten years to life. The court held that the indeterminate sentence
law was not applicable to capital offenses. "Where an offense, such as
robbery with a deadly weapon, is punishable by death, the statute prescribes no maximum term of punishment and the indeterminate sentence law does not apply." 274 It is obvious that the statute does prescribe
a maximum term, "imprisonment for life," and therefore the court's
reasoning is somewhat curious. However, it can reasonably be said that
the indeterminate sentence statute is intended to apply where a minimum-maximum term is the only possible punishment, and thus capital
offenses are not included. Apparently this is the basis of the present
decision.
3. Credit for Time in Mental Hospital
In 1954, the defendant in Marsh v. Henderson27 5 was charged with
first degree murder. He was determined to be incapable of standing
trial by virtue of insanity and was committed to the maximum security
unit of a state mental hospital pursuant to statute. 27 6 Over eleven years
later he was adjudged capable of standing trial, was returned to the
criminal court, and plead guilty to second degree murder. He received a
sentence of from ten to twenty years. It was the defendant's contention
that he should be credited on his sentence with the time he spent in the
mental hospital. The relevant statute, Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 40-3102, provides, inter alia, that the defendant shall be allowed
"credit on his sentence for any period of time for which he was committed and held in county jail or workhouse pending his arraignment
and trial." In an exceedingly obscure passage, the court said,
[I]t seems to us that the enumeration undertaken by the Legislature in this statute was descriptive and restrictive (sic) of the
statute (§ 40-3102, T.C.A.) an (sic) if ilt had been intended to be
limited to "county jail or workhouse pending his arraignment
and trial" and others ejusdem generis the broad purposes of the
statute could not have been employed without doing violence
to that intent. The primary emphasis of the second paragraph
of the statute is on the word "committed" and as authorizing
credit for time following such a commitment. When we thus

274. Id. at 803.
275. 424 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. 1968).
276. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-702 (Supp. 1968).
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view this statute it seems to us that the words indicative of the
place of confinement are descriptive of places of confinement, and
not exclusive of any other lawful place of commitment and detention.277

Examining the case as a problem of statutory construction, the conclusion reached by the court is difficult to follow. The doctrine of
ejusdem generis is totally irrelevant, as that principle of construction is
only applicable when a general term follows a series of specific terms,
and the court is attempting to ascertain the scope of the general term. 278

Thus, if the statute had read "county jail, workhouse, or other place
of confinement," the doctrine of e'usdem generis would be used to determine the meaning of the final phrase.27 9 Here, however, the statute
merely enumerates two specifics-"county jail or workhouse"-and
the applicable rule of construction is the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,280 or the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another. Thus, presumptively, where an inclusive specifica-tion has
been made by the legislature, the court will not make additions to the
statutory enumeration.
If the problem is approached as a question of legislative intent, the
initial response must be that legislative intent is first to be determined
by the language employed in the statute, which in this instance appears
quite explicit. The statute under the authority of which the defendant
was committed to the hospital was enacted in the same year, but prior
to, the present statute regarding the crediting of sentences. 28 1 Thus the
legislature can be assumed to know this possible disposition of a criminal
defendant at the time the latter statute was enacted. The failure of the
legislature to include such a form of custody in the sentencing statute
is again evidence of legislative intent adverse to the court's conclusion.
Only when examining the problem from a broad policy perspective,
ignoring the language of the statute, can the conclusion reached be defended. The maximum security statute is unequivocally a form of
criminal detention and is therefore analogous to pre-trial detention in
jails or workhouses. There is no less reason to credit a prisoner with
time spent before trial in a maximum security hospital than in any

277. 424 S.W.2d at 196. Presumably, the first sentence should read "descriptive
not restrictive."
278. 2 SUTHERLAND §§ 4909 et seq.
279. See People ex rel. Striar v. Fay, 14 Misc.2d 231, 178 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1958).
280. 2 SUTHERLAND §§ 4915 et seq.
281. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-702 (Supp. 1968), was passed by the legislature February
22, 1965; the relevant portion of TENN. CoDE ANN. § 40-3102 (Supp. 1968) was
passed by the legislature March 17, 1965.
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other form of custody. Decisions on the precise issue raised in this
case are sparse. 28 2 A few courts have reached the same holding as in the
principal case, 283 but none has confronted the same obstacle of statutory language.
4.

Parole

There is no constitutional right to parole, and therefore where it is
given it may be subject to conditions so long as they are reasonably
related to the purposes of conditional release. Thus it was held to be
a reasonable condition of parole to prohibit the parolee from associating
with an ex-convict after midnight. 284 Nor can a parolee complain of a
statutory provision 28 5 which provides that if a parolee is convicted of a
felony committed while on parole, he will be required to serve the remainder of his original sentence before beginning to serve the sentence
imposed for the new felony, and that he will not be eligible to earn any
good and honor time on the remaining portion of his first sentence. 28 6
In Rose v. Haskins28 7 the issue was raised as to whether a parolee
could be declared a parole violator without a hearing. While on parole,
the parolee was charged with molesting his daughter. Following his
arrest for parole violation, he requested that he be prosecuted for the
substantive offense so that he could defend against the charge, but the
prosecutor refused to do so because he did not have a warrant from the
accuser. By the revocation of his parole, the parolee contended that he
had been denied confrontation of his accusers, examination of witnesses,
arraignment, right to counsel, trial by jury and the privilege of appeal.
The court held that all the rights claimed by the parolee were applicable
prior to conviction. "They are not applicable to a convicted felon
whose convictions and sentences have not been served." 288 The court
held that Mempa v. Rhay, 28 9 recognizing a right to counsel at a proceeding where probation was revoked and sentence imposed for the first
290
time, was distinguishable.

282. See generally, 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1995 (5) (1962).
283. In re Steams, 343 Mass. 53, 175 N.E.2d 470 (1961); People ex rel. Molina v.
Noble, 28 Misc.2d 646, 216 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1961). But see Ex parte Roberts, 3i0
Mich. 372, 17 N.W.2d 218 (1945).
284. DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967).
285. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3620 (1955).
286. Stanley v. Avery, 387 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1968).
287. 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968).
288. Id. at 95.
289. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
290. A vigorous dissent was written by Celebrezzee, C.J.
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L. Double Jeopardy
1. State and Municipal Prosecutions
In Robinson v. Henderson291 the defendant had been convicted
in a state court of assault with intent to murder. He had also been
convicted in a city court on three counts of assault arising out of the
same incident. He sought a writ of habeas corpus contending that he
had twice been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The federal
district court held 292 that the fifth amendment protection against
double jeopardy did not extend to the states, 29 3 nor was the double

' 294
prosecution so shocking as to constitute "fundamental unfairness.
This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. While it may be
granted that the principal of federalism justifies the nonintervention
of a court in successive federal-state or state-federal prosecutions, 295 the
rationale cannot be analogized to successive state-municipal or municipalstate prosecutions, as no federal relationship exists between these governmental entities-the municipality has derived its authority from the
state. Nevertheless, the principal case reflects the prevailing view that
2 96
no double jeopardy violation has occurred.

2. Determination of Insanity
297
A novel double jeopardy question was raised in Bell v. State.
The defendant was charged with murder and his counsel entered a plea
"that on September 20, 1959, and prior to said date, and subsequent to
said date, and at all times covered by the indictment herein, the
Defendant, Thomas Bell, was legally insane." The case went to trial
solely on the issue of sanity. The judgment of the trial court was
as follows:
The Attorney General read the indictment to the jury, thereupon the defendant entered a plea in bar alleging insanity.
391 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1968).
268 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
The court cited Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), for this principle.
Citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
See Bartkus v. Illinois, note 293 supra; Abate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959).
296. See generally, Kneier, Prosecution under State Law and Municipal Ordinance
as Double Jeopardy, 16 CORN. L.Q. 201 (1933).
While it is not within the scope of concern of a federal court considering a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the double jeopardy question can not be
avoided merely by the assertion that the fifth amendment protection has not
been extended to the states, because the same protection is afforded by the
TENN. CONST. Art. 1, § 10. Under this provision, however, successive municipalstate prosecutions have been allowed. Greenwood v. State, 65 Tenn. 567
(1873); State v. Mason, 71 Tenn. 649 (1879); State ex rel. Karr v. Taxing District, 84 Tenn. 240 (1886).
297. 423 S.W.2d 482 (Tenn. 1968).
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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There was then introduced as testimony the statement of a
number of physicians of Central State Hospital and it was
stipulated by both the State and the Defendant that the statement read in evidence would be the testimony of the doctors if
called as witnesses. Both sides rested, both sides discussed the
case with the jury. The court instructed the jury in the premise,
thereupon the jury retired to consider their verdict. Upon their
return into court they announced
as their verdict that they found
298
the defendant was insane.
Subsequently the defendant was determined to be sane and was tried
and convicted of murder. On appeal, the defendant contended that
he had been placed in double jeopardy. The supreme court concluded
that ,the -trial court had decided nothing more than the defendant was
insane at the time of his trial, and that no determination had as yet
been made on the defendant's culpability for the crime charged.299
Therefore, the defendant had not been placed in former jeopardy, and
the conviction could be affirmed.
3.

Harsher Sentence on Re-Trial

Where a defendant successfully attacks the validity of his conviction
on appeal or by collateral attack, more often than not the case will be
remanded for a new trial. The question of whether the imposition of
a harsher sentence following a second or subsequent conviction constitutes a violation of the protection against double jeopardy is unsettled.
0
In -the case of Murphy v. State oo
the defendant had received a twenty
year sentence at his first trial and on re-trial received a fifty year sentence. The court held that when a defendant procures the setting aside
of a judgment against him, he is precluded to complain of the result of
his retrial. 01 The California Supreme Court has found a violation of
the protection against double jeopardy where a defendant charged with
first degree murder received life imprisonment at his first trial and on

298. Id. at 484.
299. "[Unquestionably the only thing before the court when this man was tried
was his present insanity even though the plea said that he was crazy at the
time, had been crazy all the time, etc., because it is obvious that the only
proof offered was that of the hospital attendants, the doctors who said that
the man was crazy when they examined him and that was after the crime
had been committed." Id. at 486.
300. 426 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1968).
301. In support of its holding, the court cited State ex rel. Austin v. Johnson, 218
Tenn. 433, 404 S.W.2d 244 (1966), a case not in point. There the issue was
whether the defendant could be retried at all following a reversal because the
defendant was a juvenile at the time of his original conviction, and thus should
hav been treated as such. The principal case would appear to be the firs
Tennessee decision raising the question of a greater sentence on re-trial.
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re-trial received the death penalty, 30 2 and similar decisions may be found
elsewhere. 30 3 Other jurisdictions have followed the rule of the principal
30 4
case.
M. Juvenile Proceedings
While offenses committed by persons under the age of eighteen
normally come within the jurisdiction of juvenile courts,3 05 in the case
of certain designated serious offenses, the accused will be tried as an
adult if he is at least fourteen years of age. 806 In State ex rel. Donehue
v. Russell,30 7 interpreting a superceded statute but one identical in
material part,308 the court held that remanding such a case to the
criminal court was mandatory, and no preliminary hearing on the part
of the juvenile court was required. In regard to certain other offenses,
the juvenile court has the discretionary authority to waive its jurisdiction,8 0 9 and a decision of a juvenile court to do so is a "disposition of
312
a child," 1 0 which, according to In re Houston,311 may be appealed.
N. Habeas Corpus
Two questions regarding the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
were raised in Ussery v. Avery. 313 First, a statute 314 provides that when
a warden of a penitentiary is served with a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus,
If the party is detained under a writ, warrant, or other written
authority, a copy thereof shall be annexed to the return, and the
original shall
be produced and exhibited to the court or judge,
15
if required.8
302. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
303. See, e.g,. Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied

390 U.S. 905 (1968).

304. U.S. ex rel. Starnes v. Russell, 378 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389
U.S. 889 (1967); U.S. v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389
U.S. 1052 (1968); State v. Young, 200 Kan. 20, 434 P.2d 829 (1968); Moon v.
State, 243 A.2d 564 (Md. 1968); State v. Jacques, 99 N.J. Super. 230, 239 A.2d
252 (1968).
305. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-242 et seq. (Supp. 1968).
306. Id. § 37-265 (Supp. 1968).
307. 429 S.W.2d 818 (Tenn. 1967).
308. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-231 (1955).
309. Id. § 37-264 (Supp. 1968).
310. Id. § 37-273 (Supp. 1968).
311. 428 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1968).
312. The yet-unreported decision of State v. Henderson, 4 CraM. L. RPTR. 2035
(Tenn. Crim. App., Sept. 19, 1968), held that where the only issue before the
juvenile court was whether the offense charged would require transfer to
criminal court, the right to counsel afforded by the decision of In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1966), did not apply.
313. 432 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. 1968).
314. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1823 (1955).

315. id.
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The respondent in the present action was allowed to prove his authority
for the detention by the introduction of the minutes of the criminal
court, which showed two judgments of conviction of the petitioner. The
court held that such .proof did not comply with the statute and was
therefore inadequate.
Second, the issue was raised, when a petitioner claims that one of
two judgments against him is void, may he attack the allegedly void
judgment before he completes serving his sentence on the other judgment. Here the court found the controlling statute3 1 6 unequivocal to
the effect that the petition would not be entertained "where the time
during which such party may be legally detained has not expired."31 7
Finding nothing unconstitutional in the provision, the court ruled that
the petitioner would have to wait until the time he would be eligible
for release were the second judgment void, taking into account all good
time that would have been deducted from his sentence on the conceded
valid judgment.

316. Id. § 23-1831 (1955).
317. Id. The result, however, is not as absolutely compelling as
lead one to believe. It is conceivable that a writ of habeas
issued in respect to the void judgment, and then, in accordance
the petitioner be remanded to custody to complete his legal
an interpretation is not inconsistent with the language of the

the court might
corpus could be
with the statute,
detention. Such
statute.

